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Date: Wed, 04 Sep 2013 11:25:21 -0400
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@...thhorseman.net>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE request: unauthorized host/service views displayed
in servicegroup view
[dropping cc's, just leaving oss-security]
On 09/03/2013 07:02 PM, Vincent Danen wrote:
> I mean, if someone wants to shoot themselves in the foot and document it
> as a feature, who are we to say otherwise? We may not agree with it,
> but it's a documented feature (deliberately changed), so we can't just
> very well call it a security flaw because we don't like the new
> behaviour.
I'm curious about this. If, say, a modern TLS library some day decides
to get around to implementing (old, deprecated, known-insecure,
previously-unimplemented) SSLv2, and announces it as a feature, and
enables it by default, is the consensus of this group that we would not
treat it as worthy of a CVE, despite being a clear security weakening?
At what point does the security community override the upstream
decisions and declare the packages vulnerable?
--dkg
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