Date: Mon, 10 Oct 2011 15:12:39 +0200 From: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com> CC: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Mitre CVE assign department <cve-assign@...re.org>, Security Focus Team <vuldb@...urityfocus.com>, "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org> Subject: CVE ASSIGNMENT CORRECTION -- USE CVE-2011-3590 instead of CVE-2011-2390 [was: Re: kexec-tools: Multiple security flaws by management of kdump core files and ramdisk images] Hello vendors, 1) apologize for capital letters in the subject. Just wanted this message not to be overlooked, since it's important. On 10/05/2011 04:34 AM, Huzaifa Sidhpurwala wrote: > Hi All, > > Kevan Carstensen reported multiple security flaws in kexec-tools, > details are as follows: > > 1. CVE-2011-3588: > > The default value of "StrictHostKeyChecking=no" has been used for kdump/ > mkdumprd openssh integration. A remote malicious kdump server could use > this flaw to impersonate the intended, correct kdump server to obtain > security sensitive information (kdump core files). > > 2. CVE-2011-3589 > > mkdumprd utility copied content of certain directories into newly > created initial ramdisk images, potentially leading to information leak. > > 3. CVE-2011-2390 2) Due to a mistake, an incorrect CVE identifier of CVE-2011-2390 was used here / in the previous post. The proper one should be CVE-2011-3590, as detailed here:  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=716439#c61 Since there are some incorrect references present in the public already:  http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/49944/info we wanted to kindly ask you to update your entries. CVE-2011-2390 is NOT the correct one, please use CVE-2011-3590 identifier to reference the following security flaw: 3. kdump/mkdumprd copies all the .ssh keys of root user on the vmcore file. This may include keys which are not-required and may be confidential to the root user also. in the kexec-tools package. Apologize to all of the affected parties for the inconvenience. Thank you && Regards, Jan. -- Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Response Team > > mkdumprd utility created the final initial ramdisk image with > world-readable permissions, possibly leading to information leak. > > Reference: > https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=716439 > >
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