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Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2010 12:12:18 -0500
From: Steve Grubb <>
Cc: Dan Rosenberg <>
Subject: Re: Linux kernel address leaks

On Tuesday, November 23, 2010 12:00:51 pm Dan Rosenberg wrote:
> I don't think it's appropriate to use CVEs as a blackmailing tool, and
> I don't actually think these issues need CVEs.  But claiming that it
> would be inappropriate to assign them because they're not "security
> problems" is a bit misguided.  We're not talking about leaking
> function addresses here - we're talking about leaking the addresses of
> live kernel data structures, which in my opinion is more of a risk.

But you can't access kernel memory as a common user unless you already have a second 
bug. That second bug is the CVE. Saying this leak helps escate privs is like saying 
/etc/password leaks account names. You already have to have system access to use that 

That said, why don't upstream kernel allow 0's for the memory addresses? I don't know 
of any tool that uses the memory address information. What user space uses is the 
inode, path, and network address/port fields. (netstat, lsof, netcap)


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