Date: Sun, 05 Sep 2010 15:25:24 +0100 From: Richard Moore <rich@...tpoint.ltd.uk> To: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com>, "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>, oss-security <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>, Simon Ward <simon@...tpoint.ltd.uk> Subject: Re: CVE Request 1, NSS 2, Qt: Doesn't handle wildcards in Common Name properly On 04/09/2010 14:37, Joe Orton wrote: > On Fri, Sep 03, 2010 at 06:20:49PM +0200, Jan Lieskovsky wrote: >> 1, Network Security Services (NSS) handled wildcard (*) character >> in the Common Name field of a x509v3 digital certificate. >> If an attacker is able to get a carefully-crafted certificate, >> signed by a Certificate Authority trusted by Firefox, the attacker >> could use the certificate during the man-in-the-middle attack and >> potentially confuse Firefox into accepting it by mistake. Different >> vulnerability than CVE-2009-2408. > > I would suspect that many of the usual raft of OpenSSL-based apps with > hand-crafted cert identity checks will be vulnerable to this too, where > wildcard certs are supported. We did try some other openssl based apps but most had either no wildcard support, no real CN validation, or wildcard support that use the old-style shell-globs which is much worse anyway. Unlike NSS openssl doesn't provide a function for performing CN validation which means that apps have generally rolled their own (poor) implementations. Cheers Rich. > > Regards, Joe > > -- Richard Moore, Principal Software Engineer, Westpoint Ltd, Albion Wharf, 19 Albion Street, Manchester, M1 5LN, England Tel: +44 161 237 1028 Fax: +44 161 237 1031
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