Date: Sat, 4 Sep 2010 14:37:25 +0100 From: Joe Orton <jorton@...hat.com> To: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com> Cc: "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>, oss-security <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>, Richard Moore <rich@...tpoint.ltd.uk>, Simon Ward <simon@...tpoint.ltd.uk> Subject: Re: CVE Request 1, NSS 2, Qt: Doesn't handle wildcards in Common Name properly On Fri, Sep 03, 2010 at 06:20:49PM +0200, Jan Lieskovsky wrote: > 1, Network Security Services (NSS) handled wildcard (*) character > in the Common Name field of a x509v3 digital certificate. > If an attacker is able to get a carefully-crafted certificate, > signed by a Certificate Authority trusted by Firefox, the attacker > could use the certificate during the man-in-the-middle attack and > potentially confuse Firefox into accepting it by mistake. Different > vulnerability than CVE-2009-2408. I would suspect that many of the usual raft of OpenSSL-based apps with hand-crafted cert identity checks will be vulnerable to this too, where wildcard certs are supported. Regards, Joe
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