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Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2008 19:01:29 +0200
From: Nico Golde <>
Subject: Re: CVE id requests: gmanedit

Hi Steven,
* Steven M. Christey <> [2008-09-09 18:12]:
> On Sat, 6 Sep 2008, Steffen Joeris wrote:
> > There are two possible buffer overflows in gmanedit. One is via crafted
> > configuration file and the other one via crafted manual page.
> > See the Debian bug report for more information.
> >
> Use CVE-2008-3971, which covers the manual page and (if it's
> security-relevant) the configuration page.  Even though the source of
> attack is different, the vuln type is the same.
> Nico - I don't know the typical usage scenarios for gmanedit, but if the
> design of the configuration file allows the user to define dangerous
> actions (such as their own executable commands), then it's clearly not
> intended for external influence and wouldn't count as a vuln in my book.
> Still would be merged under CVE-2008-3971 if there's a scenario.

I share your opinion here, I'd rather see the COMMANDS thing 
as an application bug as a user who doesn't read the 
configuration but just uses it could also get owned with a 
valid command. The only difference I see is that as far as I 
understood the command is only executed after user action 
while the configuration value is read without. The manpage 
utf-8 conversion is the real vulnerability as it is possible 
to exploit a victim by opening a crafted manpage in 

Nico Golde - - - GPG: 0x73647CFF
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