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Message-ID: <CAEqUM+c8Wd=-sEMC5FSX5t-yBncYO56_BaaH20GHNOZqDnVV+w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2026 01:00:00 +0300
From: Nagakamira <nagakamira@...il.com>
To: musl@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Proposed CVE policy

Sometimes it is right to follow principles of what openbsd people doing,
not to that level of extreme unless you clearly securing your systems

On Sat, Nov 21, 2026, 00:53 Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org> wrote:

> I've never had to write up a policy for this before because it always
> seemed obvious, but with the deluge of non-issue or minor bug reports
> other projects are getting hit with and pressured to treat as security
> bugs meriting CVE assignment, I'd like to make it explicit:
>
>
> For library code with gigantic interface surface and an unbounded set
> of library consuming applications, any deviation, no matter how minor,
> from the specified interface contract is *potentially* a security
> issue. It's always possible a caller uses an interface in a way that
> its security/integrity properties depend on the contract being met
> precisely, and that the bug breaks these properties. However, for most
> bugs, it's very unlikely that this would happen unless the application
> has been written to be intentionally fragile just to make a point.
>
> Regardless, it is entirely unhelpful to treat each bug as a security
> issue, for many reasons including:
>
> - Burying the serious issues among a sea of nothingburgers, causing
>   defenders to miss announcements of issues that actually matter.
>
> - Overwhelming defenders and pressuring them to rely on unvetted
>   upgrade/patching advice from automated processes/chatbots that are
>   likely to be wrong.
>
> - Hiding fix for normal bugs behind embargo procedures where there is
>   no public input, making the process opaque and untrustworthy and
>   likely resulting in new bugs when there are fewer additional eyes on
>   the fixes being proposed.
>
> So I will not be jumping on the "everything is a CVE!" bandwagon.
>
>
>
> In the past, my informal approach to whether to treat a bug as a
> security issue and seek (or request that the reporter seek) CVE
> assignment for it has been based on:
>
> 1. It actually being a bug, rather than just a lack of hardening or a
>    footgun or similar. Unlike many things, libc (at least the
>    standards-governed part) does have rigorous interface contracts
>    that establish which party has a burden to fix.
>
> 2. Exposure of the affected interface(s) to untrusted input, and
>    whether these interfaces can be reasonably expected to be safe with
>    untrusted input. For example, printf with untrusted format strings
>    is unsafe (UB from argument type mismatch), regcomp/regexec with
>    BRE is unsafe (exponential time for backrefs), and wordexp is
>    wildly unsafe (shell processing). Some interfaces like the
>    passwd/group database, the dynamic linker, and timezone data
>    process inherently-trusted data. In the other direction, things
>    like iconv, DNS resolution, crypt, etc. are very much expected to
>    be exposed as attack surface.
>
> 3. What happens when the bug is triggered - are there risks of
>    arbitrary code execution, data loss, authentication bypass, log
>    falsification, or even just crashing of important long-lived
>    processes under reasonable use of the affected interfaces?
>
> Going forward, I want to continue to assess things from these
> perspectives, but with bug reporters also having knowledge of them so
> that we're on the same page about what to expect.
>
> Going into some detail on item 1 above and how interface contracts are
> involved;
>
> - If the application-libc system is vulnerable but the libc behavior
>   is in a standards-specified function and behaving in a conforming
>   manner, it is not a libc security bug. It may merit hardening.
>
> - If the application-libc system is vulnerable but the libc behavior
>   is part of a nonstandard extension, and there are other historical
>   implementations of this extension that would be similarly affected,
>   it is not a libc security bug. It may of course merit hardening or
>   other improvements.
>
> - If the application-libc system is vulnerable and an application
>   honoring the interface contracts of the libc interfaces can cause
>   libc-internal undefined behavior, corruption of state, etc. then it
>   very much is a libc bug, and may be a security one depending on the
>   other principles 2 and 3 above.
>
>
> This document is a draft largely written on the spot based on my
> understanding of how we've done things in the past. If anything in it
> seems off or if folks disagree (either that it accurately describes
> past informal policy, or disagree with it as principles for going
> forward), particularly from a distros/integrators/users perspective,
> I'd be happy to discuss improvements.
>
> Rich
>

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