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Message-ID: <20261120095300.GA9164@openwall.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 10:53:00 +0100
From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
To: Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org>
Cc: Lukas Tribus <lukas@...i.eu>, musl@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: crypt: unsupported hash behavior
On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 05:32:49PM -0500, Rich Felker wrote:
> How does the attached version look?
>
> Rich
> >From 5dd7e5c3e9b989fd0ff3aae0b5b5afe3ff93e438 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Rich Felker <dalias@...ifal.cx>
> Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 10:33:32 -0500
> Subject: [PATCH] crypt: drop support for non-strict des salts in new hashes
>
> our descrypt implementation followed a historical practice of
> interpreting salt characters outside the set [./0-9A-Za-z] as
> alternate/noncanonical encodings. this served basically no purpose
> except possibly supporting des hashes made on ancient systems
> enforcing the salt character set. however, allowing this for new
I guess you meant "not enforcing".
> hashes has several negative consequences, including:
>
> 1. unrecognized hash types encoded with "$n$" notation get interpreted
> as very weak, fixed-value des salts.
>
> 2. with low but plausible probability, the result of des hashing a
> salt consisting of a '$' followed by a digit can produce hash bits
> that mimic the setting for a different hash type, resulting in a hash
> that will be unmatchable later (user locked out).
>
> with this change, noncanonical salt characters are still interpreted
> and result in a hash being computed, but the result is thrown away and
> replaced with failure unless the full hash containing them was passed
> as the setting and the password matches.
>
> the self-test in top-level __crypt_des is updated to canonicalize the
> test salt; without this change, the self-test would always have
> failed.
> ---
> src/crypt/crypt_des.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/src/crypt/crypt_des.c b/src/crypt/crypt_des.c
> index 38e63395..90c0093a 100644
> --- a/src/crypt/crypt_des.c
> +++ b/src/crypt/crypt_des.c
> @@ -672,6 +672,15 @@ static inline int ascii_is_unsafe(unsigned char ch)
> return !ch || ch == '\n' || ch == ':';
> }
>
> +/*
> + * We only allow noncanonical salt characters for checking existing
> + * hashes, not producing new ones.
> + */
> +static inline int ascii_is_noncanonical(unsigned char ch)
> +{
> + return ch!='.' && ch!='/' && (ch|32)-'a'>=26U && ch-'0'>=10U;
> +}
> +
> static uint32_t setup_salt(uint32_t salt)
> {
> uint32_t obit, saltbit, saltbits;
> @@ -978,6 +987,25 @@ static char *_crypt_extended_r_uut(const char *_key, const char *_setting, char
> *p++ = ascii64[l & 0x3f];
> *p = 0;
>
> + /*
> + * Fail non-canonically-encoded salts unless the entire
> + * matching hash was passed as setting.
> + */
> + if (output[0] != _PASSWORD_EFMT1 &&
> + (ascii_is_noncanonical(output[0]) ||
> + ascii_is_noncanonical(output[1]))) {
> + if (strlen(_setting) != 13) return NULL;
> + /*
> + * Intended as constant-time to avoid disclosing length
> + * of partial hash match, which may be sensitive for DES.
> + * In any case, only executed for non-canonical salts.
> + */
> + unsigned sum = 0;
> + for (i = 0; i < 13; i++)
> + sum += (output[i] - _setting[i]) & 255;
I'd write this using the canonical OR/XOR approach instead of ADD/SUB...
but perhaps you had reasons? Signed types and integer promotion, trying
to reduce risk of this getting optimized to a conditional branch?
Anyway, I looked at the generated code for your version and it's good,
so let's leave it as you wrote it above.
Incidentally, the "& 255" is in fact needed when we ADD rather than OR
because otherwise a subsequent addition of a negative value could bring
the result back to zero.
> + if (sum) return NULL;
> + }
> +
> return output;
> }
>
> @@ -992,8 +1020,8 @@ char *__crypt_des(const char *key, const char *setting, char *output)
> const char *p;
>
> if (*setting != _PASSWORD_EFMT1) {
> - test_setting = "\x80x";
> - test_hash = "\x80x22/wK52ZKGA";
> + test_setting = "Gx";
> + test_hash = "Gx22/wK52ZKGA";
> }
>
> /*
Not addressing the issue of leaving the hash in memory yet, but I assume
that's intentional not to address in this same patch?
Alexander
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