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Message-ID: <49438cb3-3dc6-451a-a60b-49c5a34e4f8a@gmail.com> Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2025 20:18:04 -0400 From: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@...il.com> To: musl@...ts.openwall.com, Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org>, Georg Kotheimer <georg.kotheimer@...nkonzept.com> Subject: Re: Bug: Stack buffer overflow in printf on aarch64 On 9/19/25 18:52, Rich Felker wrote: > On Fri, Sep 19, 2025 at 06:25:03PM -0400, Rich Felker wrote: >> On Fri, Sep 19, 2025 at 10:20:54PM +0200, Georg Kotheimer wrote: >>> Hi, >>> >>> now I am a little confused, are you referring to the commit >>> f96e47a26102d537c29435f0abf9ec94676a030e ("printf: fix regression in >>> large double formatting on ld128 archs"), which is available on the >>> master branch? Or are you referring to some internal git that is not >>> visible to the public? >>> >>> Because if it's the former, it seems like the fix is insufficient, as I >>> just rechecked which commit I had checked out locally, it is >>> 0b86d60badad6a69b37fc06d18b5763fbbf47b58, which includes the >>> aforementioned fix. But still I observe the overflow I reported. >> >> Thank you so much for finding this. Indeed, the math is incorrect. >> max_mant_slots is computed as if each slot held at least 29 bits, >> which would be true if they were being expanded to the left of the >> radix point. But they're not. The initial y has 29 bits to the left of >> the radix point, but all the rest are to the right. >> >> At each stage of peeling bits, 29 bits are extracted to the next slot >> in *z, but the multiplication by 1000000000 adds back 21 bits to the >> mantissa of y. This nets only 8 bits being peeled. >> >> And indeed, using the formula 1+(ldbl_mant_dig-29+7)/8, representing 1 >> slot for the initial 29 bits, counting off 29 bits initially peeled, >> and adding 8 per iteration, gives 12 as an upper bound, which agrees >> with the empirical result of 11 iterations for your worst-case value. >> >> (The upper bound is not sharp because multiplying by 1e9 doesn't >> actually add a "whole" 21 bits, but some fraction of the last bit.) >> >> I'll prepare a proposed patch. > > See attached. Is a new release with the security fix planned? -- Sincerely, Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers) Download attachment "OpenPGP_0xB288B55FFF9C22C1.asc" of type "application/pgp-keys" (7141 bytes) Download attachment "OpenPGP_signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (834 bytes)
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