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Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2021 09:23:53 -0500
From: Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org>
To: jvoisin <julien.voisin@...tri.org>
Cc: musl@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Zero the leading stack canary byte
On Mon, Dec 13, 2021 at 01:24:38PM +0100, jvoisin wrote:
> > As written this patch assumes a 64-bit uintptr_t, which isn't ok.
> > Indeed 56 bits should be fine on a 64-bit arch, but dropping from 32
> > to 24 on a 32-bit arch severely weakens the protection. So it probably
> > needs to be conditional on 64-bit.
> Will do.
>
> > Also, zeroing the first byte means we can no longer catch buffer
> > overflows of the form "off-by-one string length". This seems
> > unfortunate. Putting the 0 byte at the end would solve that at the
> > expense of allowing the canary value to be leaked via missing
> > termination bugs, and overall I would lean towards catching actual
> > buffer overflow bugs vs stopping canary leaks.
> As discussed on IRC, what about zero'ing the second byte instead? This
> would allow to catch overflows, as well as preventing canary
> leaks/overwrite via string-manipulating functions.
That seems like a good idea too. Note that it can be done without
masking logic and large constants just with:
((char *)&__stack_chk_guard)[1] = 0;
And beginning or end could have been done just by reducing the memcpy
length by 1.
Rich
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