Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2014 02:10:15 -0800 From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org> To: Rich Felker <dalias@...ifal.cx> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, libc-alpha <libc-alpha@...rceware.org>, musl@...ts.openwall.com, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org> Subject: Re: Re: [RFC] Possible new execveat(2) Linux syscall On Mon, Nov 17, 2014 at 01:30:10PM -0500, Rich Felker wrote: > On Mon, Nov 17, 2014 at 03:42:15PM +0000, David Drysdale wrote: > > I'm not familiar with O_EXEC either, I'm afraid, so to be clear -- does > > O_EXEC mean the permission check is explicitly skipped later, at execute > > time? In other words, if you open(O_EXEC) an executable then remove the > > execute bit from the file, does a subsequent fexecve() still work? > > Yes. It's just like how read and write permissions work. If you open a > file for read then remove read permissions, or open it for write then > remove write permissions, the existing permissions to the open file > are not lost. Of course open with O_EXEC/O_SEARCH needs to fail if the > caller does not have +x access to the file/directory at the time of > open. Adding a FMODE_EXEC similar to FMODE_READ/WRITE would be trivial.
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