[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <165601D7-9BA2-4746-9F91-2584AB55CDEC@openbsd.org>
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 10:54:04 -0500
From: Brent Cook <busterb@...il.com>
To: Isaac Dunham <ibid.ag@...il.com>
Cc: musl@...ts.openwall.com,
beck@...nbsd.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] implement issetugid(2)
On Jul 14, 2014, at 9:40 PM, Isaac Dunham <ibid.ag@...il.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 12, 2014 at 05:54:51PM -0600, Brent Cook wrote:
>> From: Brent Cook <brent@...ndary.com>
>>
>> From OpenBSD 2.0 and later, NetBSD, FreeBSD, OS X and Solaris
>> http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=issetugid&sektion=2
> <snip>
>> The fix is to implement the BSD issetugid(2) interface so that a
>> portable library can use its presence to determine if the underlying C
>> library has a reliable way of determining the value of AT_SECURE, and by
>> extension if the library is running with elevated privileges. If the
>> call fails, it assumes secure mode rather than falling back to an
>> insecure result.
>
> My previous response to your last email didn't get sent to you, for which
> I apologize. But to summarize:
> -auxval is initialized at ELF load time, so a setuid/setgid binary will
> always show up if privileges were gained.
> -AT_SECURE was added before filesystem capabilities (prior to kernel 2.6.0,
> I believe), so any system where checking AT_SECURE fails and auxval is properly
> initialized cannot obtain privileges except by setuid/setgid*
> -If auxval is not properly initialized (I'm not aware of any such cases),
> it cannot be detected if getauxval() is broken, but looking up AT_E?[UG]ID
> will also fail.
This makes sense, I have sent v3 of the patch. I am pretty sure we have not yet begun looking at some other aspects of running libressl on a 2.4 kernel, but this is a fine start.
I went ahead and subscribed anyway with my gmail account, so you don’t have to CC me directly necessarily (though please CC beck@).
Musl looks like a very nice project in general, and I can definitely see more uses for it @ the day job. We’ve had some customers that apparently build our code on musl for a while (via Alpine linux), and given that they never needed any patches or sent any bug reports, I’m going to assume it’s been 100% compatible.
Thank you!
- Brent
> In other words, for the fallback used to set libc.secure to "fail open",
> you would have to have a 2.4 kernel, the 2.6.x filesystem code
> (including filesystem capabilities), AND no backport of AT_SECURE.
>
> [*] Unless we start talking about rootkits; I suspect detecting rootkits
> to avoid privilege escalation attacks on the rootkit via environmental
> variables doesn't make that much sense. ;)
>
> See below for further comments.
>
>> ---
>> include/unistd.h | 3 +++
>> src/unistd/issetugid.c | 10 ++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
>> create mode 100644 src/unistd/issetugid.c
>>
>> diff --git a/include/unistd.h b/include/unistd.h
>> index bb19cd8..3990c1e 100644
>> --- a/include/unistd.h
>> +++ b/include/unistd.h
>> @@ -109,6 +109,9 @@ uid_t geteuid(void);
>> gid_t getgid(void);
>> gid_t getegid(void);
>> int getgroups(int, gid_t []);
>> +#if defined(_BSD_SOURCE)
>> +int issetugid(void);
>> +#endif
>> int setuid(uid_t);
>> int setreuid(uid_t, uid_t);
>> int seteuid(uid_t);
>
> As a point of style, #ifdef sections stand in separate blocks, after all the
> non-ifdef stuff.
>
>> diff --git a/src/unistd/issetugid.c b/src/unistd/issetugid.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..f538626
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/src/unistd/issetugid.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
>> +#include <sys/auxv.h>
>> +#include "libc.h"
>> +
>> +int issetugid(void)
>> +{
>> + size_t *auxv = libc.auxv;
>> + for (; *auxv; auxv+=2)
>> + if (*auxv==AT_SECURE) return auxv[1] != 0;
>> + return 1;
>> +}
>
> This can be "return libc.secure;" unless you're concerned about the possibility
> that someone backported filesystem capabilities to a 2.4.x kernel without
> bothering to add AT_SECURE to auxval.
>
> Thanks and hope this helps,
> Isaac Dunham
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
