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Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2023 11:29:20 +0000
From: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
To: Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, "Shishkin, Alexander"
<alexander.shishkin@...el.com>, "Shutemov, Kirill"
<kirill.shutemov@...el.com>, "Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan"
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<lukas.wunner@...el.com>, Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@...ux.intel.com>,
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"linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev" <linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>, "Linux Kernel
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<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: RE: Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing
> On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 03:29:07PM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
> > Replying only to the not-so-far addressed points.
> >
> > > On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 12:28:13PM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
> > > > Hi Greg,
>
> <...>
>
> > > > 3) All the tools are open-source and everyone can start using them right
> away
> > > even
> > > > without any special HW (readme has description of what is needed).
> > > > Tools and documentation is here:
> > > > https://github.com/intel/ccc-linux-guest-hardening
> > >
> > > Again, as our documentation states, when you submit patches based on
> > > these tools, you HAVE TO document that. Otherwise we think you all are
> > > crazy and will get your patches rejected. You all know this, why ignore
> > > it?
> >
> > Sorry, I didn’t know that for every bug that is found in linux kernel when
> > we are submitting a fix that we have to list the way how it has been found.
> > We will fix this in the future submissions, but some bugs we have are found by
> > plain code audit, so 'human' is the tool.
>
> My problem with that statement is that by applying different threat
> model you "invent" bugs which didn't exist in a first place.
>
> For example, in this [1] latest submission, authors labeled correct
> behaviour as "bug".
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230119170633.40944-1-
> alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com/
Hm.. Does everyone think that when kernel dies with unhandled page fault
(such as in that case) or detection of a KASAN out of bounds violation (as it is in some
other cases we already have fixes or investigating) it represents a correct behavior even if
you expect that all your pci HW devices are trusted? What about an error in two
consequent pci reads? What about just some failure that results in erroneous input?
Best Regards,
Elena.
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