[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2021 21:27:15 +0100
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Andrew Morton
<akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@...il.com>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>, Christian Heimes
<christian@...hon.org>, Deven Bowers <deven.desai@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Eric Chiang <ericchiang@...gle.com>, Geert Uytterhoeven
<geert@...ux-m68k.org>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Jan Kara
<jack@...e.cz>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet
<corbet@....net>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Lakshmi
Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>, "Madhavan T . Venkataraman"
<madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>, Miklos Szeredi
<mszeredi@...hat.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, Paul Moore
<paul@...l-moore.com>, Philippe Trébuchet
<philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr>, Scott Shell <scottsh@...rosoft.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>,
Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, Thibaut Sautereau
<thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>, Vincent Strubel
<vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>, Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@...el.com>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 0/3] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC)
* Mickaël Salaün:
> Primary goal of trusted_for(2)
> ==============================
>
> This new syscall enables user space to ask the kernel: is this file
> descriptor's content trusted to be used for this purpose? The set of
> usage currently only contains execution, but other may follow (e.g.
> configuration, sensitive data). If the kernel identifies the file
> descriptor as trustworthy for this usage, user space should then take
> this information into account. The "execution" usage means that the
> content of the file descriptor is trusted according to the system policy
> to be executed by user space, which means that it interprets the content
> or (try to) maps it as executable memory.
I sketched my ideas about “IMA gadgets” here:
IMA gadgets
<https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/11/30/1>
I still don't think the proposed trusted_for interface is sufficient.
The example I gave is a Perl module that does nothing (on its own) when
loaded as a Perl module (although you probably don't want to sign it
anyway, given what it implements), but triggers an unwanted action when
sourced (using .) as a shell script.
> @usage identifies the user space usage intended for @fd: only
> TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION for now, but trusted_for_usage could be extended
> to identify other usages (e.g. configuration, sensitive data).
We would need TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION_BY_BASH,
TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION_BY_PERL, etc. I'm not sure that actually works.
Caller process context does not work because we have this confusion
internally between glibc's own use (for the dynamic linker
configuration), and for loading programs/shared objects (there seems to
be a corner case where you can execute arbitrary code even without
executable mappings in the ELF object), and the script interpreter
itself (the primary target for trusted_for).
But for generating auditing events, trusted_for seems is probably quite
helpful.
Thanks,
Florian
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
