Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 10:30:32 -0800 From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...il.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Paul McKenney <paulmck@...nel.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>, Maciej Rozycki <macro@...am.me.uk>, Muchun Song <songmuchun@...edance.com>, Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@...aro.org>, Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>, Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>, Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>, Wei Liu <wl@....org>, John Ogness <john.ogness@...utronix.de>, Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>, Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@...abs.ru>, Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...nel.org>, David S Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Andrew Scull <ascull@...gle.com>, Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@...nel.org>, Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@...gle.com>, Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>, Wang Qing <wangqing@...o.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@...e.de>, Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@...nel.org>, Andrew Klychkov <andrew.a.klychkov@...il.com>, Mathieu Chouquet-Stringer <me@...hieu.digital>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, Stephen Kitt <steve@....org>, Stephen Boyd <sboyd@...nel.org>, Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@...ha.franken.de>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>, Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@...aro.org>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>, linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, notify@...nel.org, main@...ts.elisa.tech, safety-architecture@...ts.elisa.tech, devel@...ts.elisa.tech, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] Introduce the pkill_on_warn parameter On 11/18/2021 9:32 AM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, Nov 16, 2021 at 11:00:23AM -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: >> On 11/16/2021 10:41 AM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> On Tue, Nov 16, 2021 at 12:12:16PM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote: >>>> What if the Linux kernel had a LSM module responsible for error handling policy? >>>> That would require adding LSM hooks to BUG*(), WARN*(), KERN_EMERG, etc. >>>> In such LSM policy we can decide immediately how to react on the kernel error. >>>> We can even decide depending on the subsystem and things like that. >>> That would solve the "atomicity" issue the WARN tracepoint solution has, >>> and it would allow for very flexible userspace policy. >>> >>> I actually wonder if the existing panic_on_* sites should serve as a >>> guide for where to put the hooks. The current sysctls could be replaced >>> by the hooks and a simple LSM. >> Do you really want to make error handling a "security" issue? >> If you add security_bug(), security_warn_on() and the like >> you're begging that they be included in SELinux (AppArmor) policy. >> BPF, too, come to think of it. Is that what you want? > Yeah, that is what I was thinking. This would give the LSM a view into > kernel state, which seems a reasonable thing to do. If system integrity > is compromised, an LSM may want to stop trusting things. How are you planning to communicate the security relevance of the warning to the LSM? I don't think that __FILE__, __LINE__ or __func__ is great information to base security policy on. Nor is a backtrace. > A dedicated error-handling LSM could be added for those hooks that > implemented the existing default panic_on_* sysctls, and could expand on > that logic for other actions. I can see having an interface like LSM for choosing a bug/warn policy. I worry about expanding the LSM hook list for a case where I would hope no existing LSM would use them, and the new LSM doesn't use any of the existing hooks.
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