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Message-Id: <20211010144814.d9fb99de6b0af65b67dc96cb@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 2021 14:48:14 -0700
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
 Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Casey
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 <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 0/3] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC)

On Fri,  8 Oct 2021 12:48:37 +0200 Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:

> The final goal of this patch series is to enable the kernel to be a
> global policy manager by entrusting processes with access control at
> their level.  To reach this goal, two complementary parts are required:
> * user space needs to be able to know if it can trust some file
>   descriptor content for a specific usage;
> * and the kernel needs to make available some part of the policy
>   configured by the system administrator.

Apologies if I missed this...

It would be nice to see a description of the proposed syscall interface
in these changelogs!  Then a few questions I have will be answered...

long trusted_for(const int fd,
		 const enum trusted_for_usage usage,
		 const u32 flags)

- `usage' must be equal to TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION, so why does it
  exist?  Some future modes are planned?  Please expand on this.

- `flags' is unused (must be zero).  So why does it exist?  What are
  the plans here?

- what values does the syscall return and what do they mean?

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