Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 06:33:02 +0000 From: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>, "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>, Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@...data.co.jp>, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ux.microsoft.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) On Tue, Mar 30, 2021 at 11:03:10PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > Regardless, I still endorse this change because it doesn't make things > _worse_, since without this, a compromised process wouldn't need ANY > tricks to escape a chroot because it wouldn't be in one. :) It'd be nice > if there were some way to make future openat() calls be unable to > resolve outside the chroot, but I view that as an enhancement. > > But, as it stands, I think this makes sense and I stand by my > Reviewed-by tag. If Al is too busy to take it, and James would rather > not take VFS, perhaps akpm would carry it? That's where other similar > VFS security work has landed. Frankly, I'm less than fond of that thing, but right now I'm buried under all kinds of crap (->d_revalidate() joy, mostly). I'll post a review, but for now it's very definitely does *not* get an implicit ACK from me.
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