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Date: Thu, 01 Apr 2021 00:38:31 +0200
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
On Wed, Mar 31 2021 at 14:54, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 31, 2021 at 09:53:26AM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> On Tue, Mar 30 2021 at 13:57, Kees Cook wrote:
>> > +/*
>> > + * Do not use this anywhere else in the kernel. This is used here because
>> > + * it provides an arch-agnostic way to grow the stack with correct
>> > + * alignment. Also, since this use is being explicitly masked to a max of
>> > + * 10 bits, stack-clash style attacks are unlikely. For more details see
>> > + * "VLAs" in Documentation/process/deprecated.rst
>> > + * The asm statement is designed to convince the compiler to keep the
>> > + * allocation around even after "ptr" goes out of scope.
>>
>> Nit. That explanation of "ptr" might be better placed right at the
>> add_random...() macro.
>
> Ah, yes! Fixed in v9.
Hmm, looking at V9 the "ptr" thing got lost ....
> +/*
> + * Do not use this anywhere else in the kernel. This is used here because
> + * it provides an arch-agnostic way to grow the stack with correct
> + * alignment. Also, since this use is being explicitly masked to a max of
> + * 10 bits, stack-clash style attacks are unlikely. For more details see
> + * "VLAs" in Documentation/process/deprecated.rst
> + */
> +void *__builtin_alloca(size_t size);
> +/*
> + * Use, at most, 10 bits of entropy. We explicitly cap this to keep the
> + * "VLA" from being unbounded (see above). 10 bits leaves enough room for
> + * per-arch offset masks to reduce entropy (by removing higher bits, since
> + * high entropy may overly constrain usable stack space), and for
> + * compiler/arch-specific stack alignment to remove the lower bits.
> + */
> +#define KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(x) ((x) & 0x3FF)
> +
> +/*
> + * These macros must be used during syscall entry when interrupts and
> + * preempt are disabled, and after user registers have been stored to
> + * the stack.
> + */
> +#define add_random_kstack_offset() do { \
> Do you want to take this via -tip (and leave off the arm64 patch until
> it is acked), or would you rather it go via arm64? (I've sent v9 now...)
Either way is fine.
Thanks,
tglx
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