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Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 01:44:14 +0100
From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@...nel.org>,
Patrick Bellasi <patrick.bellasi@....com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@...xchg.org>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@...x.de>,
Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@....com>,
kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, notify@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/6] Break heap spraying needed for exploiting
use-after-free
On Tue, Oct 06, 2020 at 12:56:33AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> It seems to me like, if you want to make UAF exploitation harder at
> the heap allocator layer, you could do somewhat more effective things
> with a probably much smaller performance budget. Things like
> preventing the reallocation of virtual kernel addresses with different
> types, such that an attacker can only replace a UAF object with
> another object of the same type. (That is not an idea I like very much
> either, but I would like it more than this proposal.) (E.g. some
> browsers implement things along those lines, I believe.)
The slab allocator already has that functionality. We call it
TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, but if forcing that on by default would enhance security
by a measurable amount, it wouldn't be a terribly hard sell ...
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