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Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2020 16:49:08 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: John Wood <john.wood@....com>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@...hat.com>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@...aro.org>,
Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@....com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Ben Segall <bsegall@...gle.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@...e.de>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@...gle.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 5/6] security/fbfam: Detect a fork brute force attack
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 01:21:06PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> From: John Wood <john.wood@....com>
>
> To detect a fork brute force attack it is necessary to compute the
> crashing rate of the application. This calculation is performed in each
> fatal fail of a task, or in other words, when a core dump is triggered.
> If this rate shows that the application is crashing quickly, there is a
> clear signal that an attack is happening.
>
> Since the crashing rate is computed in milliseconds per fault, if this
> rate goes under a certain threshold a warning is triggered.
>
> Signed-off-by: John Wood <john.wood@....com>
> ---
> fs/coredump.c | 2 ++
> include/fbfam/fbfam.h | 2 ++
> security/fbfam/fbfam.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/coredump.c b/fs/coredump.c
> index 76e7c10edfc0..d4ba4e1828d5 100644
> --- a/fs/coredump.c
> +++ b/fs/coredump.c
> @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
> #include "internal.h"
>
> #include <trace/events/sched.h>
> +#include <fbfam/fbfam.h>
>
> int core_uses_pid;
> unsigned int core_pipe_limit;
> @@ -825,6 +826,7 @@ void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
> fail_creds:
> put_cred(cred);
> fail:
> + fbfam_handle_attack(siginfo->si_signo);
I don't think this is the right place for detecting a crash -- isn't
this only for the "dumping core" condition? In other words, don't you
want to do this in get_signal()'s "fatal" block? (i.e. very close to the
do_coredump, but without the "should I dump?" check?)
Hmm, but maybe I'm wrong? It looks like you're looking at noticing the
process taking a signal from SIG_KERNEL_COREDUMP_MASK ?
(Better yet: what are fatal conditions that do NOT match
SIG_KERNEL_COREDUMP_MASK, and should those be covered?)
Regardless, *this* looks like the only place without an LSM hook. And it
doesn't seem unreasonable to add one here. I assume it would probably
just take the siginfo pointer, which is also what you're checking.
e.g. for include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h:
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_coredump, const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo);
> return;
> }
>
> diff --git a/include/fbfam/fbfam.h b/include/fbfam/fbfam.h
> index 2cfe51d2b0d5..9ac8e33d8291 100644
> --- a/include/fbfam/fbfam.h
> +++ b/include/fbfam/fbfam.h
> @@ -12,10 +12,12 @@ extern struct ctl_table fbfam_sysctls[];
> int fbfam_fork(struct task_struct *child);
> int fbfam_execve(void);
> int fbfam_exit(void);
> +int fbfam_handle_attack(int signal);
> #else
> static inline int fbfam_fork(struct task_struct *child) { return 0; }
> static inline int fbfam_execve(void) { return 0; }
> static inline int fbfam_exit(void) { return 0; }
> +static inline int fbfam_handle_attack(int signal) { return 0; }
> #endif
>
> #endif /* _FBFAM_H_ */
> diff --git a/security/fbfam/fbfam.c b/security/fbfam/fbfam.c
> index 9be4639b72eb..3aa669e4ea51 100644
> --- a/security/fbfam/fbfam.c
> +++ b/security/fbfam/fbfam.c
> @@ -4,7 +4,9 @@
> #include <linux/errno.h>
> #include <linux/gfp.h>
> #include <linux/jiffies.h>
> +#include <linux/printk.h>
> #include <linux/refcount.h>
> +#include <linux/signal.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
>
> /**
> @@ -172,3 +174,40 @@ int fbfam_exit(void)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +/**
> + * fbfam_handle_attack() - Fork brute force attack detection.
> + * @signal: Signal number that causes the core dump.
> + *
> + * The crashing rate of an application is computed in milliseconds per fault in
> + * each crash. So, if this rate goes under a certain threshold there is a clear
> + * signal that the application is crashing quickly. At this moment, a fork brute
> + * force attack is happening.
> + *
> + * Return: -EFAULT if the current task doesn't have statistical data. Zero
> + * otherwise.
> + */
> +int fbfam_handle_attack(int signal)
> +{
> + struct fbfam_stats *stats = current->fbfam_stats;
> + u64 delta_jiffies, delta_time;
> + u64 crashing_rate;
> +
> + if (!stats)
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (!(signal == SIGILL || signal == SIGBUS || signal == SIGKILL ||
> + signal == SIGSEGV || signal == SIGSYS))
> + return 0;
This will only be called for:
#define SIG_KERNEL_COREDUMP_MASK (\
rt_sigmask(SIGQUIT) | rt_sigmask(SIGILL) | \
rt_sigmask(SIGTRAP) | rt_sigmask(SIGABRT) | \
rt_sigmask(SIGFPE) | rt_sigmask(SIGSEGV) | \
rt_sigmask(SIGBUS) | rt_sigmask(SIGSYS) | \
rt_sigmask(SIGXCPU) | rt_sigmask(SIGXFSZ) | \
SIGEMT_MASK )
So you're skipping:
SIGQUIT
SIGTRAP
SIGABRT
SIGFPE
SIGXCPU
SIGXFSZ
SIGEMT_MASK
I would include SIGABRT (e.g. glibc will call abort() for stack
canary, malloc, etc failures, which may indicate a mitigation has
fired).
--
Kees Cook
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