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Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 17:52:28 +0100
From: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
To: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
James Morse <james.morse@....com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>,
Michal Marek <michal.lkml@...kovi.net>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@...hat.com>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@...aro.org>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@...il.com>,
clang-built-linux@...glegroups.com,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS)
On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 01:45:46PM -0700, Sami Tolvanen wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 12:21:14PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > Also, since you mentioned the lack of redzoning, isn't it a bit dodgy
> > allocating blindly out of the kmem_cache? It means we don't have a redzone
> > or a guard page, so if you can trigger something like a recursion bug then
> > could you scribble past the SCS before the main stack overflows? Would this
> > clobber somebody else's SCS?
>
> I agree that allocating from a kmem_cache isn't ideal for safety. It's a
> compromise to reduce memory overhead.
Do you think it would be a problem if we always allocated a page for the
SCS?
> > The vmap version that I asked Sami to drop
> > is at least better in this regard, although the guard page is at the wrong
> > end of the stack and we just hope that the allocation below us didn't pass
> > VM_NO_GUARD. Looks like the same story for vmap stack :/
>
> SCS grows up and the guard page is after the allocation, so how is it at
> the wrong end? Am I missing something here?
Sorry, I'd got the SCS upside-down in my head (hey, that second 'S' stands
for 'Stack'!). But I think I'm right about vmap stack, which feels a
little fragile even though it seems to work out today with the very limited
uses of VM_NO_GUARD.
> > If we split the pointer in two (base, offset) then we could leave the
> > base live in the thread_info, not require alignment of the stacks (which
> > may allow for unconditional redzoning?) and then just update the offset
> > value on context switch, which could be trivially checked as part of the
> > existing stack overflow checking on kernel entry.
>
> I sent out v13 with split pointers, but I'm not sure it's convenient to
> add an overflow check to kernel_ventry where the VMAP_STACK check is
> done. I suppose I could add a check to kernel_entry after we load x18
> from tsk. Thoughts?
I'll take a look at v13, since at this stage I'm keen to get something
queued up so that we can use it as a base for further improvements without
you having to repost the whole stack every time.
Cheers,
Will
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