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Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:06:09 +0100
From: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
Cc: kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@...wei.com>, Jan Glauber <jglauber@...vell.com>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [RESEND PATCH v4 05/10] lib/refcount: Improve performance of
generic REFCOUNT_FULL code
On Fri, Feb 28, 2020 at 11:43 AM Will Deacon <will@...nel.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 05:10:46AM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
> > On Thu, Nov 21, 2019 at 12:58 PM Will Deacon <will@...nel.org> wrote:
> > > + * If another thread also performs a refcount_inc() operation between the two
> > > + * atomic operations, then the count will continue to edge closer to 0. If it
> > > + * reaches a value of 1 before /any/ of the threads reset it to the saturated
> > > + * value, then a concurrent refcount_dec_and_test() may erroneously free the
> > > + * underlying object. Given the precise timing details involved with the
> > > + * round-robin scheduling of each thread manipulating the refcount and the need
> > > + * to hit the race multiple times in succession, there doesn't appear to be a
> > > + * practical avenue of attack even if using refcount_add() operations with
> > > + * larger increments.
> >
> > On top of that, the number of threads that can actually be running at
> > a given time is capped. See include/linux/threads.h, where it is
> > capped to pow(2, 22):
> >
> > /*
> > * A maximum of 4 million PIDs should be enough for a while.
> > * [NOTE: PID/TIDs are limited to 2^29 ~= 500+ million, see futex.h.]
> > */
> > #define PID_MAX_LIMIT (CONFIG_BASE_SMALL ? PAGE_SIZE * 8 : \
> > (sizeof(long) > 4 ? 4 * 1024 * 1024 : PID_MAX_DEFAULT))
> >
> > And in the futex UAPI header, we have this, baking a TID limit into
> > the userspace API (note that this is pow(2,30), not pow(2,29) as the
> > comment in threads.h claims - I'm not sure where that difference comes
> > from):
> >
> > /*
> > * The rest of the robust-futex field is for the TID:
> > */
> > #define FUTEX_TID_MASK 0x3fffffff
> >
> > So AFAICS, with the current PID_MAX_LIMIT, if you assume that all
> > participating refcount operations are non-batched (delta 1) and the
> > attacker can't cause the threads to oops in the middle of the refcount
> > operation (maybe that would be possible if you managed to find
> > something like a NULL pointer dereference in perf software event code
> > and had perf paranoia at <=1 , or something like that? - I'm not
> > sure), then even in a theoretical scenario where an attacker spawns
> > the maximum number of tasks possible and manages to get all of them to
> > sequentially preempt while being in the middle of increment operations
> > in several nested contexts (I'm not sure whether that can even happen
> > - you're not going to take typical sleeping exceptions like page
> > faults in the middle of a refcount op), the attacker will stay
> > comfortably inside the saturated range. Even if the PID_MAX_LIMIT is
> > at some point raised to the maximum permitted by the futex UAPI, this
> > still holds as long as you assume no nesting. Hm, should I send a
> > patch to add something like this to the explanatory comment?
>
> Sure, I'd be happy to improve the document by adding this -- please send
> out a patch for review. It's probably also worth mentioning the batching
> use-cases, although I struggle to reason about the window between the
> {under,over}flow occuring and saturation.
In the overflow case, it's fine, right? If you briefly crossed into
the saturation range and then went back down, using some tasks with
half-completed refcounting operations, then the refcount is still
behaving as a correct non-saturating refcount. (And it can't cross
over to the other end of the saturation range, because that's twice as
much distance as you'd need to unpin a saturated refcount.)
And in the underflow case, we can't deterministically protect anyway
without some external mechanism to protect the object's lifetime while
someone is already freeing it - so that's pretty much just a
best-effort thing anyway.
> > Of course, if someone uses refcount batching with sufficiently large
> > values, those guarantees go out of the window - if we wanted to be
> > perfectionist about this, we could make the batched operations do slow
> > cmpxchg stuff while letting the much more performance-critical
> > single-reference case continue to use the fast saturation scheme.
> > OTOH, the networking folks would probably hate that, since they're
> > using the batched ops for ->sk_wmem_alloc stuff, where they count
> > bytes as references? So I guess maybe we should leave it as-is.
>
> Agreed. If we hamper the performance here, then people will either look
> to disable the checking or they will switch to atomic_t, which puts us
> back to square one. Perfection is the enemy of the good and all that.
>
> Having said that, I'd still be keen to learn about any practical attacks
> on this in case there is something smart we can do to mitigate them
> without cmpxchg(). For example, one silly approach might be to bound the
> maximum increment and split larger ones up using a loop.
I guess that'd do the job. I don't know whether it's worth the trouble
in practice though.
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