Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2019 09:04:26 +0000 From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com> To: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>, Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@...il.com>, Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>, clang-built-linux <clang-built-linux@...glegroups.com>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 10/17] arm64: disable kretprobes with SCS On Mon, Nov 04, 2019 at 03:42:09PM -0800, Sami Tolvanen wrote: > On Mon, Nov 4, 2019 at 9:05 AM Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com> wrote: > > I'm a bit confused as to why that's the case -- could you please > > elaborate on how this is incompatible? > > > > IIUC kretrobes works by patching the function entry point with a BRK, so > > that it can modify the LR _before_ it is saved to the stack. I don't see > > how SCS affects that. > > You're correct. While this may not be optimal for reducing attack > surface, I just tested this to confirm that there's no functional > conflict. I'll drop this and related patches from v5. Great; thanks for confirming! Mark.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.