Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2019 23:36:05 +0100 From: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@...il.com> To: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>, Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>, clang-built-linux <clang-built-linux@...glegroups.com>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 05/17] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) On Fri, Nov 1, 2019 at 11:12 PM Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com> wrote: > > This change adds generic support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack, > which uses a shadow stack to protect return addresses from being > overwritten by an attacker. Details are available here: > > https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html > > Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the > ones documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses > of shadow stacks used by other tasks and interrupt handlers in > memory, which means an attacker capable reading and writing > arbitrary memory may be able to locate them and hijack control > flow by modifying shadow stacks that are not currently in use. > > Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com> > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@...il.com> Cheers, Miguel
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.