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Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 17:44:39 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
Florent Revest <revest@...omium.org>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@...omium.org>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Mickaël Salaün <mickael.salaun@....gouv.fr>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
bpf@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v12 1/7] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock hooks
Add a new type of eBPF program used by Landlock hooks. The goal of this
type of program is to accept or deny a requested access from userspace
to a kernel object (e.g. process). This will be more useful with the
next commit adding a new eBPF helper.
This new BPF program type will be registered with the Landlock LSM
initialization.
Add an initial Landlock Kconfig and update the MAINTAINERS file.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
---
Changes since v10:
* replace file system program types with a (simpler) ptrace program type
* add an eBPF task pointer type
* split files
Changes since v9:
* handle inode put and map put, which fix unmount (reported by Al Viro)
* replace subtype with expected_attach_type and expected_attach_triggers
* check eBPF program return code
Changes since v8:
* Remove the chaining concept from the eBPF program contexts (chain and
cookie). We need to keep these subtypes this way to be able to make
them evolve, though.
* remove bpf_landlock_put_extra() because there is no more a "previous"
field to free (for now)
Changes since v7:
* cosmetic fixes
* rename LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_* to LANDLOCK_*
* cleanup UAPI definitions and move them from bpf.h to landlock.h
(suggested by Alexei Starovoitov)
* disable Landlock by default (suggested by Alexei Starovoitov)
* rename BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_{RULE,HOOK}
* update the Kconfig
* update the MAINTAINERS file
* replace the IOCTL, LOCK and FCNTL events with FS_PICK, FS_WALK and
FS_GET hook types
* add the ability to chain programs with an eBPF program file descriptor
(i.e. the "previous" field in a Landlock subtype) and keep a state
with a "cookie" value available from the context
* add a "triggers" subtype bitfield to match specific actions (e.g.
append, chdir, read...)
Changes since v6:
* add 3 more sub-events: IOCTL, LOCK, FCNTL
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2fbc99a6-f190-f335-bd14-04bdeed35571@digikod.net
* rename LANDLOCK_VERSION to LANDLOCK_ABI to better reflect its purpose,
and move it from landlock.h to common.h
* rename BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK to BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_RULE: an eBPF
program could be used for something else than a rule
* simplify struct landlock_context by removing the arch and syscall_nr fields
* remove all eBPF map functions call, remove ABILITY_WRITE
* refactor bpf_landlock_func_proto() (suggested by Kees Cook)
* constify pointers
* fix doc inclusion
Changes since v5:
* rename file hooks.c to init.c
* fix spelling
Changes since v4:
* merge a minimal (not enabled) LSM code and Kconfig in this commit
Changes since v3:
* split commit
* revamp the landlock_context:
* add arch, syscall_nr and syscall_cmd (ioctl, fcntl…) to be able to
cross-check action with the event type
* replace args array with dedicated fields to ease the addition of new
fields
---
MAINTAINERS | 8 ++++
include/linux/bpf.h | 1 +
include/linux/bpf_types.h | 3 ++
include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 2 +
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 39 ++++++++++++++++
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 9 ++++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 +++
security/Kconfig | 1 +
security/Makefile | 2 +
security/landlock/Kconfig | 19 ++++++++
security/landlock/Makefile | 4 ++
security/landlock/bpf_ptrace.c | 30 ++++++++++++
security/landlock/bpf_ptrace.h | 17 +++++++
security/landlock/bpf_verify.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/landlock/common.h | 30 ++++++++++++
15 files changed, 255 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
create mode 100644 security/landlock/Kconfig
create mode 100644 security/landlock/Makefile
create mode 100644 security/landlock/bpf_ptrace.c
create mode 100644 security/landlock/bpf_ptrace.h
create mode 100644 security/landlock/bpf_verify.c
create mode 100644 security/landlock/common.h
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 7fc074632eac..4cabb85ea52d 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -9146,6 +9146,14 @@ F: net/core/skmsg.c
F: net/core/sock_map.c
F: net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c
+LANDLOCK SECURITY MODULE
+M: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
+S: Supported
+F: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+F: security/landlock/
+K: landlock
+K: LANDLOCK
+
LANTIQ / INTEL Ethernet drivers
M: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@...ke-m.de>
L: netdev@...r.kernel.org
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 171be30fe0ae..819a3e207438 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ enum bpf_reg_type {
PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER, /* reg points to a writable raw tp's buffer */
PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, /* reg points to struct xdp_sock */
PTR_TO_BTF_ID, /* reg points to kernel struct */
+ PTR_TO_TASK, /* reg points to struct task_struct */
};
/* The information passed from prog-specific *_is_valid_access
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_types.h b/include/linux/bpf_types.h
index 36a9c2325176..bddabc961a3b 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_types.h
@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LIRC_MODE2, lirc_mode2)
#ifdef CONFIG_INET
BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT, sk_reuseport)
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK, landlock)
+#endif
BPF_MAP_TYPE(BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY, array_map_ops)
BPF_MAP_TYPE(BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY, percpu_array_map_ops)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index 4af8b0819a32..6e4147790f96 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ enum bpf_prog_type {
BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL,
BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE,
BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT,
+ BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK,
};
enum bpf_attach_type {
@@ -199,6 +200,7 @@ enum bpf_attach_type {
BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG,
BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT,
BPF_CGROUP_SETSOCKOPT,
+ BPF_LANDLOCK_PTRACE,
__MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE
};
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3ffe3cbdbad6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
+/*
+ * Landlock - UAPI headers
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2019 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#ifndef _UAPI__LINUX_LANDLOCK_H__
+#define _UAPI__LINUX_LANDLOCK_H__
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/**
+ * DOC: landlock_ret
+ *
+ * The return value of a landlock program is a bitmask that can allow or deny
+ * the action for which the program is run.
+ *
+ * In the future, this could be used to trigger an audit event as well.
+ *
+ * - %LANDLOCK_RET_ALLOW
+ * - %LANDLOCK_RET_DENY
+ */
+#define LANDLOCK_RET_ALLOW 0
+#define LANDLOCK_RET_DENY 1
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_context_ptrace - context accessible to BPF_LANDLOCK_PTRACE
+ *
+ * @tracer: pointer to the task requesting to debug @tracee
+ * @tracee: pointer to the task being debugged
+ */
+struct landlock_context_ptrace {
+ __u64 tracer;
+ __u64 tracee;
+};
+
+#endif /* _UAPI__LINUX_LANDLOCK_H__ */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index ff5225759553..5159e582a0d8 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -1621,6 +1621,15 @@ bpf_prog_load_check_attach(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type,
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+ case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK:
+ switch (expected_attach_type) {
+ case BPF_LANDLOCK_PTRACE:
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+#endif
default:
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index c59778c0fc4d..ebf1991906b7 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -421,6 +421,7 @@ static const char * const reg_type_str[] = {
[PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER] = "tp_buffer",
[PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK] = "xdp_sock",
[PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = "ptr_",
+ [PTR_TO_TASK] = "task",
};
static char slot_type_char[] = {
@@ -1878,6 +1879,7 @@ static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL:
case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
+ case PTR_TO_TASK:
return true;
default:
return false;
@@ -2600,6 +2602,9 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
pointer_desc = "xdp_sock ";
break;
+ case PTR_TO_TASK:
+ pointer_desc = "task ";
+ break;
default:
break;
}
@@ -4527,6 +4532,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL:
case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
+ case PTR_TO_TASK:
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n",
dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]);
return -EACCES;
@@ -6278,6 +6284,7 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT:
+ case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK:
break;
default:
return 0;
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 2a1a2d396228..9d9981394fb0 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ source "security/loadpin/Kconfig"
source "security/yama/Kconfig"
source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"
source "security/lockdown/Kconfig"
+source "security/landlock/Kconfig"
source "security/integrity/Kconfig"
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index be1dd9d2cb2f..60b7f6f2fd30 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock
# always enable default capabilities
obj-y += commoncap.o
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock/
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
# Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..44921bd72380
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+config SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+ bool "Landlock support"
+ depends on SECURITY
+ depends on BPF_SYSCALL
+ depends on SECCOMP_FILTER
+ default n
+ help
+ This selects Landlock, a programmatic access control. It enables to
+ restrict processes on the fly (i.e. create a sandbox) or log some
+ actions. The security policy is a set of eBPF programs, dedicated to
+ allow or deny a list of actions on specific kernel objects (e.g.
+ process).
+
+ You need to enable seccomp filter to apply a security policy to a
+ process hierarchy (e.g. application with built-in sandboxing).
+
+ See Documentation/security/landlock/ for further information.
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..682b798c6b76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
+
+landlock-y := \
+ bpf_verify.o bpf_ptrace.o
diff --git a/security/landlock/bpf_ptrace.c b/security/landlock/bpf_ptrace.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2ec73078ad01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/bpf_ptrace.c
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - eBPF ptrace
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2019 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
+
+#include "bpf_ptrace.h"
+
+bool landlock_is_valid_access_ptrace(int off, enum bpf_access_type type,
+ enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, int *max_size)
+{
+ if (type != BPF_READ)
+ return false;
+
+ switch (off) {
+ case offsetof(struct landlock_context_ptrace, tracer):
+ /* fall through */
+ case offsetof(struct landlock_context_ptrace, tracee):
+ *reg_type = PTR_TO_TASK;
+ *max_size = sizeof(u64);
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/security/landlock/bpf_ptrace.h b/security/landlock/bpf_ptrace.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..85edce37b70a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/bpf_ptrace.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - eBPF ptrace headers
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2019 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_BPF_PTRACE_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_BPF_PTRACE_H
+
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+
+bool landlock_is_valid_access_ptrace(int off, enum bpf_access_type type,
+ enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, int *max_size);
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_BPF_PTRACE_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/bpf_verify.c b/security/landlock/bpf_verify.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6ed921588178
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/bpf_verify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - eBPF program verifications
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2019 Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2019 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "bpf_ptrace.h"
+
+static bool bpf_landlock_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
+ enum bpf_access_type type, const struct bpf_prog *prog,
+ struct bpf_insn_access_aux *info)
+{
+ enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = NOT_INIT;
+ int max_size = 0;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(!prog->expected_attach_type))
+ return false;
+
+ if (off < 0)
+ return false;
+ if (size <= 0 || size > sizeof(__u64))
+ return false;
+
+ /* set register type and max size */
+ switch (get_hook_type(prog)) {
+ case LANDLOCK_HOOK_PTRACE:
+ if (!landlock_is_valid_access_ptrace(off, type, ®_type,
+ &max_size))
+ return false;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* check memory range access */
+ switch (reg_type) {
+ case NOT_INIT:
+ return false;
+ case SCALAR_VALUE:
+ /* allow partial raw value */
+ if (size > max_size)
+ return false;
+ info->ctx_field_size = max_size;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* deny partial pointer */
+ if (size != max_size)
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ info->reg_type = reg_type;
+ return true;
+}
+
+static const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_landlock_func_proto(
+ enum bpf_func_id func_id,
+ const struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ if (WARN_ON(!prog->expected_attach_type))
+ return NULL;
+
+ switch (func_id) {
+ case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem:
+ return &bpf_map_lookup_elem_proto;
+ case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem:
+ return &bpf_map_update_elem_proto;
+ case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem:
+ return &bpf_map_delete_elem_proto;
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+const struct bpf_verifier_ops landlock_verifier_ops = {
+ .get_func_proto = bpf_landlock_func_proto,
+ .is_valid_access = bpf_landlock_is_valid_access,
+};
+
+const struct bpf_prog_ops landlock_prog_ops = {};
diff --git a/security/landlock/common.h b/security/landlock/common.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0234c4bc4acd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - private headers
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2019 Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2019 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H
+
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+
+enum landlock_hook_type {
+ LANDLOCK_HOOK_PTRACE = 1,
+};
+
+static inline enum landlock_hook_type get_hook_type(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ switch (prog->expected_attach_type) {
+ case BPF_LANDLOCK_PTRACE:
+ return LANDLOCK_HOOK_PTRACE;
+ default:
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ return BPF_LANDLOCK_PTRACE;
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H */
--
2.23.0
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