[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2019 16:35:33 +0000
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
To: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@...il.com>,
Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>,
clang-built-linux <clang-built-linux@...glegroups.com>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 05/17] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS)
On Fri, Oct 25, 2019 at 01:49:21PM -0700, Sami Tolvanen wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 25, 2019 at 3:56 AM Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com> wrote:
> > > +#define SCS_END_MAGIC 0xaf0194819b1635f6UL
> >
> > Keyboard smash? ... or is there a prize for whoever figures out the
> > secret? ;)
>
> It's a random number, so if someone figures out a secret in it,
> they'll definitely deserve a prize. :)
I'll Cc some treasure hunters. :)
> > > diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> > > index bcdf53125210..ae7ebe9f0586 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/fork.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> > > @@ -94,6 +94,7 @@
> > > #include <linux/livepatch.h>
> > > #include <linux/thread_info.h>
> > > #include <linux/stackleak.h>
> > > +#include <linux/scs.h>
> >
> > Nit: alphabetical order, please (this should come before stackleak.h).
>
> The includes in kernel/fork.c aren't in alphabetical order, so I just
> added this to the end here.
Fair enough. It looked otherwise in the context, and we generally aim
for that as a soft rule.
[...]
> > > +static inline void *__scs_base(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > > +{
> > > + return (void *)((uintptr_t)task_scs(tsk) & ~(SCS_SIZE - 1));
> > > +}
> >
> > We only ever assign the base to task_scs(tsk), with the current live
> > value being in a register that we don't read. Are we expecting arch code
> > to keep this up-to-date with the register value?
> >
> > I would have expected that we just leave this as the base (as we do for
> > the regular stack in the task struct), and it's down to arch code to
> > save/restore the current value where necessary.
> >
> > Am I missing some caveat with that approach?
>
> To keep the address of the currently active shadow stack out of
> memory, the arm64 implementation clears this field when it loads x18
> and saves the current value before a context switch. The generic code
> doesn't expect the arch code to necessarily do so, but does allow it.
> This requires us to use __scs_base() when accessing the base pointer
> and to reset it in idle tasks before they're reused, hence
> scs_task_reset().
Ok. That'd be worth a comment somewhere, since it adds a number of
things which would otherwise be unnecessary.
IIUC this assumes an adversary who knows the address of a task's
thread_info, and has an arbitrary-read (to extract the SCS base from
thead_info) and an arbitrary-write (to modify the SCS area).
Assuming that's the case, I don't think this buys much. If said
adversary controls two userspace threads A and B, they only need to wait
until A is context-switched out or in userspace, and read A's SCS base
using B.
Given that, I'd rather always store the SCS base in the thread_info, and
simplify the rest of the code manipulating it.
Thanks,
Mark.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
