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Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2019 15:43:33 -0400
From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>
To: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mickael.salaun@....gouv.fr>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, Mickaël Salaün
<mic@...ikod.net>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov
<ast@...nel.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Andy Lutomirski
<luto@...nel.org>, Christian Heimes <christian@...hon.org>, Daniel Borkmann
<daniel@...earbox.net>, Eric Chiang <ericchiang@...gle.com>, James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Jann Horn
<jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Kees Cook
<keescook@...omium.org>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>, Matthew
Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>, Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, Philippe Trébuchet
<philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr>, Scott Shell <scottsh@...rosoft.com>, Sean
Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>, Shuah Khan
<shuah@...nel.org>, Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>, Steve Dower
<steve.dower@...hon.org>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, Thibaut
Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>, Vincent Strubel
<vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>, Yves-Alexis Perez
<yves-alexis.perez@....gouv.fr>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/5] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on
sys_open()
On Sat, 2019-09-07 at 03:13 +1000, Aleksa Sarai wrote:
> On 2019-09-06, Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org> wrote:
> > On Fri, 2019-09-06 at 18:06 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > > On 06/09/2019 17:56, Florian Weimer wrote:
> > > > Let's assume I want to add support for this to the glibc dynamic loader,
> > > > while still being able to run on older kernels.
> > > >
> > > > Is it safe to try the open call first, with O_MAYEXEC, and if that fails
> > > > with EINVAL, try again without O_MAYEXEC?
> > >
> > > The kernel ignore unknown open(2) flags, so yes, it is safe even for
> > > older kernel to use O_MAYEXEC.
> > >
> >
> > Well...maybe. What about existing programs that are sending down bogus
> > open flags? Once you turn this on, they may break...or provide a way to
> > circumvent the protections this gives.
>
> It should be noted that this has been a valid concern for every new O_*
> flag introduced (and yet we still introduced new flags, despite the
> concern) -- though to be fair, O_TMPFILE actually does have a
> work-around with the O_DIRECTORY mask setup.
>
> The openat2() set adds O_EMPTYPATH -- though in fairness it's also
> backwards compatible because empty path strings have always given ENOENT
> (or EINVAL?) while O_EMPTYPATH is a no-op non-empty strings.
>
> > Maybe this should be a new flag that is only usable in the new openat2()
> > syscall that's still under discussion? That syscall will enforce that
> > all flags are recognized. You presumably wouldn't need the sysctl if you
> > went that route too.
>
> I'm also interested in whether we could add an UPGRADE_NOEXEC flag to
> how->upgrade_mask for the openat2(2) patchset (I reserved a flag bit for
> it, since I'd heard about this work through the grape-vine).
>
I rather like the idea of having openat2 fds be non-executable by
default, and having userland request it specifically via O_MAYEXEC (or
some similar openat2 flag) if it's needed. Then you could add an
UPGRADE_EXEC flag instead?
That seems like something reasonable to do with a brand new API, and
might be very helpful for preventing certain classes of attacks.
--
Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>
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