Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 17:48:10 +0200
From: Alexander Potapenko <>
To: Christopher Lameter <>
Cc: Andrew Morton <>, Dmitriy Vyukov <>, 
	Kees Cook <>, Laura Abbott <>, 
	Linux Memory Management List <>, 
	linux-security-module <>, 
	Kernel Hardening <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: introduce the init_allocations=1 boot option

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 5:24 PM Christopher Lameter <> wrote:
> Hmmmm.... Maybe its better to zero on free? That way you dont need to
> initialize the allocations. You could even check if someone mucked with
> the object during allocation.
As mentioned somewhere in the neighboring threads, Kees requested the
options to initialize on both allocation and free, because we'll need
this functionality for memory tagging someday.
> This is a replication of some of the
> inherent debugging facilities in the allocator though.
I'm curious, how often do people use SL[AU]B poisoning and redzones these days?
Guess those should be superseded by KASAN already?
I agree it makes sense to reuse the existing debugging code, but on
the other hand we probably want to keep the initialization fast enough
to be used in production.
Re: poison_fn, it wasn't a good idea, so I'll be dropping it.

Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

Google Germany GmbH
Erika-Mann-Straße, 33
80636 München

Geschäftsführer: Paul Manicle, Halimah DeLaine Prado
Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.