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Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 17:11:30 -0700
From: Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
CC: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <x86@...nel.org>, <hpa@...or.com>, Thomas
 Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>, Dave Hansen
	<dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, <linux_dti@...oud.com>,
	<linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	<akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
	<linux-mm@...ck.org>, <will.deacon@....com>, <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
	<kristen@...ux.intel.com>, <deneen.t.dock@...el.com>, Rick Edgecombe
	<rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>
Subject: [PATCH v5 10/23] x86/kprobes: Set instruction page as executable

Set the page as executable after allocation.  This patch is a
preparatory patch for a following patch that makes module allocated
pages non-executable.

While at it, do some small cleanup of what appears to be unnecessary
masking.

Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
index a034cb808e7e..1591852d3ac4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
@@ -431,8 +431,20 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void)
 	void *page;
 
 	page = module_alloc(PAGE_SIZE);
-	if (page)
-		set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
+	if (!page)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * First make the page read-only, and only then make it executable to
+	 * prevent it from being W+X in between.
+	 */
+	set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page, 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: Once additional kernel code protection mechanisms are set, ensure
+	 * that the page was not maliciously altered and it is still zeroed.
+	 */
+	set_memory_x((unsigned long)page, 1);
 
 	return page;
 }
@@ -440,8 +452,12 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void)
 /* Recover page to RW mode before releasing it */
 void free_insn_page(void *page)
 {
-	set_memory_nx((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
-	set_memory_rw((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
+	/*
+	 * First make the page non-executable, and only then make it writable to
+	 * prevent it from being W+X in between.
+	 */
+	set_memory_nx((unsigned long)page, 1);
+	set_memory_rw((unsigned long)page, 1);
 	module_memfree(page);
 }
 
-- 
2.17.1

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