Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 14:47:49 -0400 From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com> To: Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz> Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>, Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>, Mickaël Salaün <mickael.salaun@....gouv.fr>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, Philippe Trébuchet <philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>, Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>, Yves-Alexis Perez <yves-alexis.perez@....gouv.fr>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, Matthew Bobrowski <mbobrowski@...browski.org> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 1/5] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on sys_open() Hello, On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 9:43:06 AM EDT Jan Kara wrote: > On Wed 12-12-18 09:17:08, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > When the O_MAYEXEC flag is passed, sys_open() may be subject to > > additional restrictions depending on a security policy implemented by an > > LSM through the inode_permission hook. > > > > The underlying idea is to be able to restrict scripts interpretation > > according to a policy defined by the system administrator. For this to > > be possible, script interpreters must use the O_MAYEXEC flag > > appropriately. To be fully effective, these interpreters also need to > > handle the other ways to execute code (for which the kernel can't help): > > command line parameters (e.g., option -e for Perl), module loading > > (e.g., option -m for Python), stdin, file sourcing, environment > > variables, configuration files... According to the threat model, it may > > be acceptable to allow some script interpreters (e.g. Bash) to interpret > > commands from stdin, may it be a TTY or a pipe, because it may not be > > enough to (directly) perform syscalls. > > > > A simple security policy implementation is available in a following > > patch for Yama. > > > > This is an updated subset of the patch initially written by Vincent > > Strubel for CLIP OS: > > https://github.com/clipos-archive/src_platform_clip-patches/blob/f5cb330d > > 6b684752e403b4e41b39f7004d88e561/1901_open_mayexec.patch This patch has > > been used for more than 10 years with customized script interpreters. > > Some examples can be found here: > > https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYE > > XEC > > > > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> > > Signed-off-by: Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr> > > Signed-off-by: Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr> > > Reviewed-by: Philippe Trébuchet <philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr> > > Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk> > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> > > Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mickael.salaun@....gouv.fr> > > ... > > > diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c > > index 0285ce7dbd51..75479b79a58f 100644 > > --- a/fs/open.c > > +++ b/fs/open.c > > @@ -974,6 +974,10 @@ static inline int build_open_flags(int flags, > > umode_t mode, struct open_flags *o> > > if (flags & O_APPEND) > > > > acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND; > > > > + /* Check execution permissions on open. */ > > + if (flags & O_MAYEXEC) > > + acc_mode |= MAY_OPENEXEC; > > + > > > > op->acc_mode = acc_mode; > > > > op->intent = flags & O_PATH ? 0 : LOOKUP_OPEN; > > I don't feel experienced enough in security to tell whether we want this > functionality or not. But if we do this, shouldn't we also set FMODE_EXEC > on the resulting struct file? That way also security_file_open() can be > used to arbitrate such executable opens and in particular > fanotify permission event FAN_OPEN_EXEC will get properly generated which I > guess is desirable (support for it is sitting in my tree waiting for the > merge window) - adding some audit people involved in FAN_OPEN_EXEC to CC. > Just an idea... Late in replying. But I think it's important to have a deep look into the issue. TL;DR - This is a gentle man's handshake. It won't _really_ solve the problem. This flag that is being proposed means that you would have to patch all interpreters to use it. If you are sure that upstreams will accept that, why not just change the policy to interpreters shouldn't execute anything unless the execute bit is set? That is simpler and doesn't need a kernel change. And setting the execute bit is an auditable event. The bottom line is that any interpreter has to become a security policy enforcement point whether by indicating it wants to execute by setting a flag or by refusing to use a file without execute bit set. But this just moves the problem to one that is harder to fix. Why in the world does any programming language allow programs to be loaded via stdin? It is possible to wget a program and pipe it into python which subsequently pulls down an ELF shared object and runs it all without touching disk via memfd_create (e.g. SnakeEater). This is all direct to memory execution. And direct to memory bypasses anti-virus, selinux, IMA, application whitelisting, and other integrity schemes. So, to fix this problem, you really need to not allow any programs to load via stdin so that everything that executes has to touch disk. This way you can get a fanotify event and see the application and vote yes/no on allowing it. And this will be particularly harder with the memfd_create fix for the runc container breakout. Prior to that, there were very few uses of that system call. Now it may be very common which means finding malicious use just got harder to spot. But assuming these problems got fixed, then we have yet another place to look. Many interpreters allow you to specify a command to run via arguments. Some have a small buffer and some allow lengthy programs to be entered as an argument. One strategy might be that an attacker can bootstrap a lengthier program across the network. Python for example allows loading modules across a network. All you need to put in the commandline is the override for the module loader and a couple modules to import. It then loads the modules remotely. Getting rid of this hole will likely lead to some unhappy people - meaning it can't be fixed. And even if we get that fixed, we have one last hole to plug. Shells. One can simply start a shell and paste their program into the shell and then execute it. You can easily do this with bash or python or any language that has a REPL (read–eval–print loop). To fix this means divorcing the notion of a language from a REPL. Production systems really do not need a Python shell, they need the interpreter. I doubt that this would be popular. But fixing each of these issues is what it would take to prevent unknown software from running. Not going this far leaves holes. Best Regards, -Steve
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