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Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:38:38 +0900
From: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Sandeep Patil <sspatil@...roid.com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Michal Marek <michal.lkml@...kovi.net>,
Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Linux Kbuild mailing list <linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area
On Fri, Apr 12, 2019 at 3:01 AM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>
> Right now kernel hardening options are scattered around various Kconfig
> files. This can be a central place to collect these kinds of options
> going forward. This is initially populated with the memory initialization
> options from the gcc-plugins.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> ---
> scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig | 74 +++--------------------------
> security/Kconfig | 2 +
> security/Kconfig.hardening | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 security/Kconfig.hardening
>
> diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
> index 74271dba4f94..84d471dea2b7 100644
> --- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
> +++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
> @@ -13,10 +13,11 @@ config HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
> An arch should select this symbol if it supports building with
> GCC plugins.
>
> -menuconfig GCC_PLUGINS
> - bool "GCC plugins"
> +config GCC_PLUGINS
> + bool
> depends on HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
> depends on PLUGIN_HOSTCC != ""
> + default y
> help
> GCC plugins are loadable modules that provide extra features to the
> compiler. They are useful for runtime instrumentation and static analysis.
> @@ -25,6 +26,8 @@ menuconfig GCC_PLUGINS
>
> if GCC_PLUGINS
>
> +menu "GCC plugins"
> +
Just a tip to save "if" ... "endif" block.
If you like, you can write like follows:
menu "GCC plugins"
depends on GCC_PLUGINS
<menu body>
endmenu
instead of
if GCC_PLUGINS
menu "GCC plugins"
<menu body>
endmenu
fi
> +menu "Memory initialization"
> +
> +choice
> + prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
> + depends on GCC_PLUGINS
On second thought,
this 'depends on' is unnecessary
because INIT_STACK_NONE should be always visible.
> + default INIT_STACK_NONE
> + help
> + This option enables initialization of stack variables at
> + function entry time. This has the possibility to have the
> + greatest coverage (since all functions can have their
> + variables initialized), but the performance impact depends
> + on the function calling complexity of a given workload's
> + syscalls.
> +
> + This chooses the level of coverage over classes of potentially
> + uninitialized variables. The selected class will be
> + initialized before use in a function.
> +
> + config INIT_STACK_NONE
> + bool "no automatic initialization (weakest)"
> + help
> + Disable automatic stack variable initialization.
> + This leaves the kernel vulnerable to the standard
> + classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits
> + and information exposures.
> +
> + config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_USER
> + bool "zero-init structs marked for userspace (weak)"
> + depends on GCC_PLUGINS
> + select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
> + help
> + Zero-initialize any structures on the stack containing
> + a __user attribute. This can prevent some classes of
> + uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
> + exposures, like CVE-2013-2141:
> + https://git.kernel.org/linus/b9e146d8eb3b9eca
> +
> + config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
> + bool "zero-init structs passed by reference (strong)"
> + depends on GCC_PLUGINS
> + select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
> + help
> + Zero-initialize any structures on the stack that may
> + be passed by reference and had not already been
> + explicitly initialized. This can prevent most classes
> + of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
> + exposures, like CVE-2017-1000410:
> + https://git.kernel.org/linus/06e7e776ca4d3654
> +
> + config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
> + bool "zero-init anything passed by reference (very strong)"
> + depends on GCC_PLUGINS
> + select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
> + help
> + Zero-initialize any stack variables that may be passed
> + by reference and had not already been explicitly
> + initialized. This is intended to eliminate all classes
> + of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
> + exposures.
> +
> +endchoice
Another behavior change is
GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK was previously enabled by all{yes,mod}config,
and in the compile-test coverage.
It will be disabled for all{yes,mod}config with this patch.
This is up to you. Just FYI.
--
Best Regards
Masahiro Yamada
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