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Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2019 10:14:45 +0000
From: "Reshetova, Elena" <>
To: Kees Cook <>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <>, Kernel Hardening
	<>, Andy Lutomirski <>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <>, Jann Horn <>, "Perla,
 Enrico" <>, Ingo Molnar <>, "Borislav
 Petkov" <>, Thomas Gleixner <>, Peter Zijlstra
	<>, Greg KH <>
Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon

> On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 4:41 AM Reshetova, Elena
> <> wrote:
> > What I still don't fully understand here (due to my little knowledge of
> > compilers) and afraid of is that the asm code that alloca generates (see my version)
> > and the alignment might differ on the different targets, etc.
> I guess it's possible, but for x86_64, since appears to be consistent.

So, yes, I double checked this now with just printing all possible offsets I get for rsp
from do_syscall_64, it is indeed 33 different offsets, so it is indeed more like 5 bits of entropy. 
We can increase it, if we want and people are ok with losing a bit more stack space. 
> > If you tried it on yours, can you send me the asm code that it produced for you?
> > Is it different from mine?
> You can compare compiler outputs here. Here's gcc vs clang for this code:
> You can adjust compiler versions, etc.

Oh, this is handy! Thank you for the link! 

So, should I resend to lkml (with some cosmetic fixes) or how to proceed with this?
I will also update the randomness bit info. 

Best Regards,

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