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Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 09:35:43 +0000
From: "Perla, Enrico" <enrico.perla@...el.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, "Reshetova, Elena"
	<elena.reshetova@...el.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Jann Horn
	<jannh@...gle.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
	"tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>, "mingo@...hat.com"
	<mingo@...hat.com>, "bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>, "tytso@....edu"
	<tytso@....edu>
Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon
 system call


> 
> It does seem that using a flaw to attack one's own registers is rather
> pointless. Maybe we'll eat our words, but for now, I'd agree.
> 

You don't attack your own registers, you use them to load controlled data to the kernel and emulate structures or similar at any stage of an exploit, bypassing SMAP and co.
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