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Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2019 13:28:02 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, 
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, 
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon
 system call

On Fri, Feb 8, 2019 at 4:16 AM Elena Reshetova
<elena.reshetova@...el.com> wrote:
> --- a/mm/usercopy.c
> +++ b/mm/usercopy.c
> @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
>  static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
>  {
>         const void * const stack = task_stack_page(current);
> -       const void * const stackend = stack + THREAD_SIZE;
> +       const void * const stackend = (void *)task_top_of_stack(current);
>         int ret;
>
>         /* Object is not on the stack at all. */

It seems like having task_top_of_stack() would be a nice refactoring
to have regardless of this feature (and splitting out would make this
patch a bit easier to read too).

-- 
Kees Cook

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