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Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2019 12:27:23 -0800
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, linux_dti@...oud.com,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@...ux.intel.com>, "Dock, Deneen T" <deneen.t.dock@...el.com>,
Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/17] x86/alternative: use temporary mm for text poking
On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 4:33 PM Rick Edgecombe
<rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com> wrote:
>
> From: Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>
>
> text_poke() can potentially compromise the security as it sets temporary
> PTEs in the fixmap. These PTEs might be used to rewrite the kernel code
> from other cores accidentally or maliciously, if an attacker gains the
> ability to write onto kernel memory.
i think this may be sufficient, but barely.
> + pte_clear(poking_mm, poking_addr, ptep);
> +
> + /*
> + * __flush_tlb_one_user() performs a redundant TLB flush when PTI is on,
> + * as it also flushes the corresponding "user" address spaces, which
> + * does not exist.
> + *
> + * Poking, however, is already very inefficient since it does not try to
> + * batch updates, so we ignore this problem for the time being.
> + *
> + * Since the PTEs do not exist in other kernel address-spaces, we do
> + * not use __flush_tlb_one_kernel(), which when PTI is on would cause
> + * more unwarranted TLB flushes.
> + *
> + * There is a slight anomaly here: the PTE is a supervisor-only and
> + * (potentially) global and we use __flush_tlb_one_user() but this
> + * should be fine.
> + */
> + __flush_tlb_one_user(poking_addr);
> + if (cross_page_boundary) {
> + pte_clear(poking_mm, poking_addr + PAGE_SIZE, ptep + 1);
> + __flush_tlb_one_user(poking_addr + PAGE_SIZE);
> + }
In principle, another CPU could still have the old translation. Your
mutex probably makes this impossible, but it makes me nervous.
Ideally you'd use flush_tlb_mm_range(), but I guess you can't do that
with IRQs off. Hmm. I think you should add an inc_mm_tlb_gen() here.
Arguably, if you did that, you could omit the flushes, but maybe
that's silly.
If we start getting new users of use_temporary_mm(), we should give
some serious thought to the SMP semantics.
Also, you're using PAGE_KERNEL. Please tell me that the global bit
isn't set in there.
--Andy
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