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Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 13:06:27 -0800
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@...cle.com>, Juerg Haefliger <juergh@...il.com>, 
	Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, jsteckli@...zon.de, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, 
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, liran.alon@...cle.com, 
	Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>, 
	deepa.srinivasan@...cle.com, chris hyser <chris.hyser@...cle.com>, 
	Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>, "Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>, 
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>, Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>, 
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>, kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com, 
	Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@...cle.com>, Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>, 
	pradeep.vincent@...cle.com, John Haxby <john.haxby@...cle.com>, 
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, 
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>, steven.sistare@...cle.com, 
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>, 
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, 
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v7 00/16] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership

On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 12:42 PM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
>
> >> The second process could easily have the page's old TLB entry.  It could
> >> abuse that entry as long as that CPU doesn't context switch
> >> (switch_mm_irqs_off()) or otherwise flush the TLB entry.
> >
> > That is an interesting scenario. Working through this scenario, physmap
> > TLB entry for a page is flushed on the local processor when the page is
> > allocated to userspace, in xpfo_alloc_pages(). When the userspace passes
> > page back into kernel, that page is mapped into kernel space using a va
> > from kmap pool in xpfo_kmap() which can be different for each new
> > mapping of the same page. The physical page is unmapped from kernel on
> > the way back from kernel to userspace by xpfo_kunmap(). So two processes
> > on different CPUs sharing same physical page might not be seeing the
> > same virtual address for that page while they are in the kernel, as long
> > as it is an address from kmap pool. ret2dir attack relies upon being
> > able to craft a predictable virtual address in the kernel physmap for a
> > physical page and redirect execution to that address. Does that sound right?
>
> All processes share one set of kernel page tables.  Or, did your patches
> change that somehow that I missed?
>
> Since they share the page tables, they implicitly share kmap*()
> mappings.  kmap_atomic() is not *used* by more than one CPU, but the
> mapping is accessible and at least exists for all processors.
>
> I'm basically assuming that any entry mapped in a shared page table is
> exploitable on any CPU regardless of where we logically *want* it to be
> used.
>
>

We can, very easily, have kernel mappings that are private to a given
mm.  Maybe this is useful here.

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