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Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2018 20:01:42 +0200
From: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...il.com>
To: Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@...il.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, rkrcmar@...hat.com,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
hpa@...or.com, x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, ovich00@...il.com,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, nigel.edwards@....com,
Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>,
Hossam Hassan <7ossam9063@...il.com>, Ahmed Lotfy <A7med.lotfey@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V5 0/5] KVM: X86: Introducing ROE Protection Kernel
Hardening
Hi,
On 26/10/2018 16:12, Ahmed Abd El Mawgood wrote:
> This is the 5th version which is 4th version with minor fixes. ROE is a
> hypercall that enables host operating system to restrict guest's access to its
> own memory. This will provide a hardening mechanism that can be used to stop
> rootkits from manipulating kernel static data structures and code. Once a memory
> region is protected the guest kernel can't even request undoing the protection.
This is very interesting, because it seems a very good match to the work
I'm doing, for supporting the creation of more targets for protection:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/10/23/3
In my case the protection would extend also to write-rate type of data.
There is an open problem of identifying legitimate write-rare
operations, however it should be possible to provide at least a certain
degree of confidence.
--
igor
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