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Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 13:34:45 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
casey.schaufler@...el.com,
dave.hansen@...el.com,
deneen.t.dock@...el.com,
kristen@...ux.intel.com,
arjan@...ux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v5 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Allow a complete ptrace access check with mode PTRACE_MODE_SCHED.
Disable the inappropriate privilege check in the capability code
that does incompatible locking.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
---
kernel/ptrace.c | 2 --
security/commoncap.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 99cfddde6a55..0b6a9df51c3b 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -331,8 +331,6 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
!ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
return -EPERM;
- if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED)
- return 0;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 2e489d6a3ac8..e77457110d05 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps))
goto out;
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED)
+ goto out;
if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto out;
ret = -EPERM;
--
2.17.1
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