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Date: Tue, 28 Aug 2018 14:51:51 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>, "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@...el.com>, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
"linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] x86: BUG() on #GP / kernel #PF in uaccess
On Tue, Aug 28, 2018 at 1:14 PM, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> wrote:
> This is the third version of "[RFC PATCH 1/2] x86: WARN() when uaccess
> helpers fault on kernel addresses".
>
> Changes since v2:
> - patch 1: avoid unnecessary branch on return value and split up the
> checks (Borislav Petkov)
> - patch 5: really plumb the error code through to the handlers (Andy)
> - patch 6: whitelist exact_copy_from_user(), at least for now - the
> alternative would be a somewhat complicated refactor (Kees Cook)
>
> Expanding on the change in patch 6:
> I believe that for now, whitelisting exact_copy_from_user() is
> acceptable, since there aren't many places that call ksys_mount() under
> KERNEL_DS.
> I very much dislike copy_mount_options()/exact_copy_from_user() and want
> to do something about that code at some point - in particular because it
> currently silently truncates mount options, which seems like a bad idea
> security-wise
> (https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/commit/34c62ee90c69) -, but I don't
> want to block this series on that.
>
> I hope that exact_copy_from_user() was the only place that does this
> kind of thing under KERNEL_DS - if there might be more places like this,
> it may be necessary for now to change the "return true;" in
> bogus_uaccess() to "WARN(1, ...); return false;" for now, and make it a
> "return true" later. Does anyone have opinions on this?
>
> This time I've actually also boot-tested a build with vmapped stack, not
> just a KASAN build. (It's annoying that those are mutually exclusive...)
> Kees, I hope you can cleanly boot with this series applied now?
>
>
> See patch 6/7 ("x86: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel
> addresses") for a description of the motivation for this series.
>
> Patches 1 and 2 are cleanups that I did while working on this
> series, but the series doesn't depend on them. (I first thought these
> cleanups were necessary for the rest of the series, then noticed that
> they actually aren't, but decided to keep them since cleanups are good
> anyway.)
>
> Patches 3, 4 and 5 are prep work; 4 and 5 are loosely based on code
> from the v1 patch. They've changed quite a bit though.
>
> Patch 6 is the main semantic change.
>
> Patch 7 is a small testcase for verifying that patch 6 works.
>
> Jann Horn (7):
> x86: refactor kprobes_fault() like kprobe_exceptions_notify()
> x86: inline kprobe_exceptions_notify() into do_general_protection()
> x86: stop calling fixup_exception() from kprobe_fault_handler()
> x86: introduce _ASM_EXTABLE_UA for uaccess fixups
> x86: plumb error code and fault address through to fault handlers
> x86: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses
> lkdtm: test copy_to_user() on bad kernel pointer under KERNEL_DS
I've done boot tests and tried probing it the earlier waitid() flaw
with the fix reverted and it correctly Oops when touching unmapped
kernel memory. Please consider the series:
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
-Kees
>
> arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 10 ++-
> arch/x86/include/asm/extable.h | 3 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h | 6 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 22 ++---
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 38 +--------
> arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 16 +++-
> arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S | 4 +-
> arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S | 90 ++++++++++----------
> arch/x86/lib/csum-copy_64.S | 8 +-
> arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 12 +--
> arch/x86/lib/putuser.S | 10 +--
> arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 126 ++++++++++++++--------------
> arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c | 4 +-
> arch/x86/mm/extable.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++----
> arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 26 +++---
> drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 +
> drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 +
> drivers/misc/lkdtm/usercopy.c | 13 +++
> fs/namespace.c | 2 +
> include/linux/sched.h | 6 ++
> mm/maccess.c | 6 ++
> 24 files changed, 314 insertions(+), 210 deletions(-)
>
> --
> 2.19.0.rc0.228.g281dcd1b4d0-goog
>
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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