Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2018 11:49:34 -0700
From: Kees Cook <>
To: Robin Murphy <>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <>, 
	Kernel Hardening <>, Mark Rutland <>, 
	Catalin Marinas <>, Will Deacon <>, 
	Christoffer Dall <>, 
	linux-arm-kernel <>, 
	Laura Abbott <>, Julien Thierry <>
Subject: Re: [RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3] arm64: basic ROP mitigation

On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 10:45 AM, Robin Murphy <> wrote:
> I guess what I'm getting at is that if the protection mechanism is "always
> return with SP outside TTBR1", there seems little point in going through the
> motions if SP in TTBR0 could still be valid and allow an attack to succeed
> anyway; this is basically just me working through a justification for saying
> the proposed scheme needs "depends on ARM64_PAN || ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN",
> making it that much uglier for v8.0 CPUs...

I think anyone with v8.0 CPUs interested in this mitigation would also
very much want PAN emulation. If a "depends on" isn't desired, what
about "imply" in the Kconfig?


Kees Cook
Pixel Security

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.