Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2018 11:49:34 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@....com>, linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...oraproject.org>, Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@....com> Subject: Re: [RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3] arm64: basic ROP mitigation On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 10:45 AM, Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com> wrote: > I guess what I'm getting at is that if the protection mechanism is "always > return with SP outside TTBR1", there seems little point in going through the > motions if SP in TTBR0 could still be valid and allow an attack to succeed > anyway; this is basically just me working through a justification for saying > the proposed scheme needs "depends on ARM64_PAN || ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN", > making it that much uglier for v8.0 CPUs... I think anyone with v8.0 CPUs interested in this mitigation would also very much want PAN emulation. If a "depends on" isn't desired, what about "imply" in the Kconfig? -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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