Date: Thu, 26 Jul 2018 18:15:58 -0400 From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org> To: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com> Cc: greg@...ah.com, Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>, salyzyn@...roid.com, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, mingo@...hat.com, kernel-team@...roid.com, stable@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses On Thu, 26 Jul 2018 09:52:11 -0700 Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com> wrote: > See the section "Kernel addresses" in > Documentation/security/self-protection. IIRC, the issue is that a > process may have CAP_SYSLOG but not necessarily CAP_SYS_ADMIN (so it > can read dmesg, but not necessarily issue a sysctl to change > kptr_restrict), get compromised and used to leak kernel addresses, > which can then be used to defeat KASLR. But the code doesn't go to dmesg. It's only available via /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/printk_formats which is only available via root. Nobody else has access to that directory. -- Steve
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