Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 22:45:33 -0400 From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com> To: Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@...il.com>, xen-devel@...ts.xensource.com Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, rkrcmar@...hat.com, nathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, hpa@...or.com, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>, Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>, David Vrabel <david.vrabel@...anix.com>, nigel.edwards@....com, Rik van Riel <riel@...riel.com> Subject: Re: Memory Read Only Enforcement: VMM assisted kernel rootkit mitigation for KVM On Thu, Jul 19, 2018 at 11:37:59PM +0200, Ahmed Abd El Mawgood wrote: > Hi, > > This is my first set of patches that works as I would expect, and the > third revision I sent to mailing lists. > > Following up with my previous discussions about kernel rootkit mitigation > via placing R/O protection on critical data structure, static data, > privileged registers with static content. These patches present the > first part where it is only possible to place these protections on > memory pages. Feature-wise, this set of patches is incomplete in the sense of: > - They still don't protect privileged registers > - They don't protect guest TLB from malicious gva -> gpa page mappings. > But they provide sketches for a basic working design. Note that I am totally > noob and it took lots of time and effort to get to this point. So sorry in > advance if I overlooked something. This reminds me of Xen PV page model. That is the hypervisor is the one auditing the page tables and the guest's pages are read-only. Ditto for IDT, GDT, etc. Gosh, did you by chance look at how Xen PV mechanism is done? It may provide the protection you are looking for? CC-ing xen-devel. > > [PATCH 1/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Memory ROE documentation > [PATCH 2/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding arbitrary data pointer in kvm memslot itterator functions > [PATCH 3/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE > > Summery: > > Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt | 14 ++++ > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 11 ++- > arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 7 ++ > arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 127 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++- > include/linux/kvm_host.h | 3 + > include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h | 1 + > virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 29 ++++++- > 8 files changed, 232 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) >
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