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Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2018 00:37:24 +0300
From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it
On 13.07.2018 00:32, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 12, 2018 at 2:22 PM, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com> wrote:
>> On 12.07.2018 23:50, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>>> Let's make sure informed users have an easy runtime way out
>>> from the worst of the overhead that doesn't involve "recompile your distro
>>> kernel". Also, make it easier to measure and fingerpoint the overhead...
>>
>> Would you like the following solution?
>>
>> I'll create the CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE config option, which would be
>> similar to CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE. That option will provide a sysctl
>> switch disabling stackleak_erase(), which provides the most of performance penalty.
>
> I don't think CONFIG/sysctl is the way to go. I'd recommend making it
> a boot arg and using a static key, similar to what's happening to
> hardened_usercopy:
>
> https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10505059/
Ok, now I see, thanks. I'll do that.
Best regards,
Alexander
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