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Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2018 17:49:30 +0100
From: Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>,
FUJITA Tomonori <fujita.tomonori@....ntt.co.jp>,
Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@...erlog.com>,
"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@...cle.com>,
linux-block@...r.kernel.org, linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
security@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] sg, bsg: mitigate read/write abuse, block uaccess in
release
On Fri, Jun 15, 2018 at 05:23:35PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> As Al Viro noted in commit 128394eff343 ("sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit
> to be called under KERNEL_DS"), sg and bsg improperly access userspace
> memory outside the provided buffer, permitting kernel memory corruption via
> splice().
> But they don't just do it on ->write(), also on ->read() and (in the case
> of bsg) even on ->release().
>
> As a band-aid, make sure that the ->read() and ->write() handlers can not
> be called in weird contexts (kernel context or credentials different from
> file opener), like for ib_safe_file_access().
> Also, completely prevent user memory accesses from ->release().
Band-aid it is, and a bloody awful one, at that. What the hell is going on
in bsg_put_device() and can it _ever_ hit that call chain? I.e.
bsg_release()
bsg_put_device()
blk_complete_sgv4_hdr_rq()
->complete_rq()
copy_to_user()
If it can, the whole thing is FUBAR by design - ->release() may bloody well
be called in a context that has no userspace at all.
This is completely insane; what's going on there?
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