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Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 18:35:18 +0400
From: Igor Stoppa <>
To: Stephen Smalley <>,,,,,
 Igor Stoppa <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 9/9] Protect SELinux initialized state with pmalloc

On 24/04/18 16:49, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 04/23/2018 08:54 AM, Igor Stoppa wrote:


>> The patch is probably in need of rework, to make it fit better with the
>> new SELinux internal data structures, however it shows how to deny an
>> easy target to the attacker.
> I know this is just an example, but not sure why you wouldn't just protect the
> entire selinux_state.

Because I have much more to discuss about SELinux, which would involve 
the whole state, the policyDB and the AVC

I will start a separate thread about that. This was merely as simple as 
possible example of the use of the API.

I just wanted to have a feeling about how it would be received :-)

> Note btw that the selinux_state encapsulation is preparatory work
> for selinux namespaces [1], at which point the structure is in fact dynamically allocated
> and there can be multiple instances of it.  That however is work-in-progress, highly experimental,
> and might not ever make it upstream (if we can't resolve the various challenges it poses in a satisfactory
> way).

Yes, I am aware of this and I would like to discuss also in the light of 
the future directions.

I just didn't want to waste too much time on something that you might 
want to change radically in a month :-)

I already was caught once by surprise when ss_initalized disappeared 
just when I had a patch ready for it :-)


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