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Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2018 14:23:17 -0700
From: Kees Cook <>
To: Salvatore Mesoraca <>
Cc: LKML <>, 
	Kernel Hardening <>, 
	"" <>, Alan Cox <>, 
	Alexander Viro <>, David Laight <>, 
	Ian Campbell <>, Jann Horn <>, 
	Matthew Wilcox <>, Pavel Vasilyev <>, 
	Solar Designer <>, "Eric W. Biederman" <>, 
	"Tobin C. Harding" <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] Protected FIFOs and regular files

On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 1:22 AM, Salvatore Mesoraca
<> wrote:
> 2018-02-27 21:22 GMT+01:00 Kees Cook <>:
>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 11:47 AM, Kees Cook <> wrote:
>>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 3:00 AM, Salvatore Mesoraca
>>> <> wrote:
>>>> Disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
>>>> writable sticky directories, unless the owner is the same as that of
>>>> the directory or the file is opened without the O_CREAT flag.
>>>> The purpose is to make data spoofing attacks harder.
>>>> This protection can be turned on and off separately for FIFOs and regular
>>>> files via sysctl, just like the symlinks/hardlinks protection.
>>>> This patch is based on Openwall's "HARDEN_FIFO" feature by Solar
>>>> Designer.
>>>> This is a brief list of old vulnerabilities that could have been prevented
>>>> by this feature, some of them even allow for privilege escalation:
>>>> CVE-2000-1134
>>>> CVE-2007-3852
>>>> CVE-2008-0525
>>>> CVE-2009-0416
>>>> CVE-2011-4834
>>>> CVE-2015-1838
>>>> CVE-2015-7442
>>>> CVE-2016-7489
>>>> This list is not meant to be complete. It's difficult to track down
>>>> all vulnerabilities of this kind because they were often reported
>>>> without any mention of this particular attack vector.
>>>> In fact, before hardlinks/symlinks restrictions, fifos/regular
>>>> files weren't the favorite vehicle to exploit them.
>>>> Suggested-by: Solar Designer <>
>>>> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <>
>>>> [...]
>>> I think this looks great.
>>> Acked-by: Kees Cook <>
>> Tested-by: Kees Cook <>
> Awesome! Thank you very much for your help!

Salvatore, do you want to send this again as a v5 with my two
follow-up patches, as I have them here:

or would you like me to send those? I would expect this series to land
via the -mm tree, since that tends to be the catch-all. (In which
case, the series should be To: akpm with everyone else in Cc.)


Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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