Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2018 15:33:49 -0800 From: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>, Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>, "Dmitry V . Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@...il.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v8 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it On 02/20/2018 03:17 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 2:29 AM, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com> wrote: >> On 16.02.2018 21:10, Alexander Popov wrote: >>> This is the 8th version of the patch series introducing STACKLEAK to the >>> mainline kernel. I've made some minor improvements while waiting for the >>> next review by x86 maintainers. > > If we can borrow some of luto or tglx's time, I think that'd be best: > they've been looking at the entry code a lot lately. :) Regardless, I > think the addition to the entry code is clean (especially now that the > fast path is gone *sob*). :P > >>> STACKLEAK is a security feature developed by Grsecurity/PaX (kudos to them), >>> which: >>> - reduces the information that can be revealed through kernel stack leak bugs; >>> - blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks (e.g. CVE-2010-2963); >>> - introduces some runtime checks for kernel stack overflow detection. > > I've added this series to my kernel.org trees, which means 0-day will > start grinding on it too now: > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git > kspp/gcc-plugin/stackleak > > The LKDTM tests look great and check out for me. I think the code is > clear, so I'd like to get it into -next, but I want to be sure I'm not > stepping on x86 toes first. > > Laura, how does arm64 look for this? Would it be possible to add it to > this series (at least on kernel.org for build/run testing)? > I fell behind on rebasing/testing so I need to bring it up to date. Assuming the arm folks are okay with the approach, we can bring it in for kernel.org testing once I'm finished. Thanks, Laura
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