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Date: Fri,  9 Feb 2018 14:39:36 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <>,,
	Jiri Slaby <>,
	Dan Williams <>,
	Thomas Gleixner <>,,,,,
	David Woodhouse <>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 67/92] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.


From: Dan Williams <>

(cherry picked from commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360)

Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections
in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the
kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim
mitigation for __user pointer de-references.

Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <>
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
 		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
-	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+	return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,

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