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Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 14:37:53 -0800
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
To: Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@...x.com>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, 
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, 
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, 
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>, 
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, 
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, 
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, 
	Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>, Adam Sampson <ats@...og.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative
 array de-references

On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 11:09 PM, Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@...x.com> wrote:
> On 1/18/2018 4:01 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>>
>> 'array_ptr' is proposed as a generic mechanism to mitigate against
>> Spectre-variant-1 attacks, i.e. an attack that bypasses boundary checks
>> via speculative execution). The 'array_ptr' implementation is expected
>> to be safe for current generation cpus across multiple architectures
>> (ARM, x86).
>
>
> I'm an outside reviewer, not subscribed to the list, so forgive me if I do
> something not according to protocol. I have the following comments on this
> change:
>
> After discarding the speculation barrier variant, is array_ptr() needed at
> all? You could have a simpler sanitizing macro, say
>
> #define array_sanitize_idx(idx, sz) ((idx) & array_ptr_mask((idx), (sz)))
>
> (adjusted to not evaluate idx twice). And use it as follows:
>
> if (idx < array_size) {
>     idx = array_sanitize_idx(idx, array_size);
>     do_something(array[idx]);
> }
>
> If I understand the speculation stuff correctly, unlike array_ptr(), this
> "leaks" array[0] rather than nothing (*NULL) when executed speculatively.
> However, it's still much better than leaking an arbitrary location in
> memory. The attacker can likely get array[0] "leaked" by passing 0 as idx
> anyway.

True, we could simplify it to just sanitize the index with the
expectation that speculating with index 0 is safe. Although we'd want
to document it just case there is some odd code paths where the valid
portion of the array is offset from 0.

I like this approach better because it handles cases where the bounds
check is far away from the array de-reference. I.e. instead of having
array_ptr() and array_idx() for different cases, just sanitize the
index.

>
>> +/*
>> + * If idx is negative or if idx > size then bit 63 is set in the mask,
>> + * and the value of ~(-1L) is zero. When the mask is zero, bounds check
>> + * failed, array_ptr will return NULL.
>> + */
>> +#ifndef array_ptr_mask
>> +static inline unsigned long array_ptr_mask(unsigned long idx, unsigned
>> long sz)
>> +{
>> +       return ~(long)(idx | (sz - 1 - idx)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1);
>> +}
>> +#endif
>
>
> Why does this have to resort to the undefined behavior of shifting a
> negative number to the right? You can do without it:
>
> return ((idx | (sz - 1 - idx)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1)) - 1;
>
> Of course, you could argue that subtracting 1 from 0 to get all ones is also
> an undefined behavior, but it's still much better than the shift, isn't it?

The goal is to prevent the compiler from emitting conditional
instructions. For example, the simplest form of this sanitize
operation from Adam:

    return 0 - ((long) (idx < sz));

...produces the desired "cmp, sbb" sequence on x86, but leads to a
"csel" instruction being emitted for arm64.

Stepping back and realizing that all this churn is around the
un-optimized form of the comparison vs the inline asm that an arch can
provide, and we're effectively handling the carry bit in software, we
can have a WARN_ON_ONCE(idx < 0 || sz < 0) to catch places where the
expectations of the macro are violated.

Archs can remove the overhead of that extra branch with an instruction
sequence to handle the carry bit in hardware, otherwise we get runtime
coverage of places where array_idx() gets used incorrectly.

>
>> +#define array_ptr(base, idx, sz)                                       \
>> +({                                                                     \
>> +       union { typeof(*(base)) *_ptr; unsigned long _bit; } __u;       \
>> +       typeof(*(base)) *_arr = (base);                                 \
>> +       unsigned long _i = (idx);                                       \
>> +       unsigned long _mask = array_ptr_mask(_i, (sz));                 \
>> +                                                                       \
>> +       __u._ptr = _arr + (_i & _mask);                                 \
>> +       __u._bit &= _mask;                                              \
>> +       __u._ptr;                                                       \
>> +})
>
>
> Call me paranoid, but I think this may actually create an exploitable bug on
> 32-bit systems due to casting the index to an unsigned long, if the index as
> it comes from userland is a 64-bit value. You have *replaced* the "if (idx <
> array_size)" check with checking if array_ptr() returns NULL. Well, it
> doesn't return NULL if the low 32 bits of the index are in-bounds, but the
> high 32 bits are not zero. Apart from the return value pointing to the wrong
> place, the subsequent code may then assume that the 64-bit idx is actually
> valid and trip on it badly.

Yes, I'll add some BUILD_BUG_ON safety for cases where sizeof(idx) >
sizeof(long).

Thanks for taking a look.

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