Date: Sun, 21 Jan 2018 17:38:09 -0800 From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com> Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v4.1 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 11:31 AM, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> wrote: > On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 8:16 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote: >>> On Jan 20, 2018, at 1:06 PM, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com> wrote: >>> The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel >>> space. Like, 'get_user, use 'MASK_NOSPEC' to prevent any out of bounds >>> speculation. While retpoline prevents speculating into the user >>> controlled target it does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern >>> is leaking memory relative to the syscall table base. >>> >>> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> >>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de> >>> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com> >>> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com> >>> Cc: x86@...nel.org >>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> >>> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com> >>> --- >>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 ++ >>> arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h | 9 ++++++++- >>> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S >>> index 63f4320602a3..584f6d2236b3 100644 >>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S >>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S >>> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ >>> #include <asm/asm.h> >>> #include <asm/smap.h> >>> #include <asm/pgtable_types.h> >>> +#include <asm/smap.h> >>> #include <asm/export.h> >>> #include <asm/frame.h> >>> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> >>> @@ -260,6 +261,7 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath: >>> cmpl $__NR_syscall_max, %eax >>> #endif >>> ja 1f /* return -ENOSYS (already in pt_regs->ax) */ >>> + MASK_NOSPEC %r11 %rax /* sanitize syscall_nr wrt speculation */ >> >> What's the threat you're protecting against? No one does any computation or data dependent loads based on the value being read. Or are you worried about ASLR leaks due to merely speculatively loading from a bogus address. > > AFAIU the threat is that you could potentially use variant 1 to get > speculative RIP control using the indirect call through the syscall > table. (I haven't tested myself whether that'd work, and I don't know > how well that would work especially when the limit for the comparison > is coming from an immediate, but apparently Dan thinks it's a > potential problem?) > In other words, this would again be an attack against the indirect > call "call *sys_call_table(, %rax, 8)", but this time, the attack > would rely on the indirect branch being resolved *properly* based on > the address read from memory instead of relying on a misprediction; > but using an index into the syscall array that is out of bounds, after > mispredicting the conditional jump for verifying that the syscall > number is in bounds. This could still work even with retpolines if the > CPU can correct mispredictions within speculative execution. Fair enough. That being said: 1. Intel needs to document this crap. I don't want a situation where we keep adding random mitigations in the hopes that we got them all. 2. Wny on Earth is MASK_NOSPEC in smap.h? 3. What's with sbb; and? I can see two sane ways to do this. One is cmovaq [something safe], %rax, *in the #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE block*. (Or is cmov subject to incorrect speculation, too? And, if cmov is, why wouldn't sbb be just as bad? At least using cmov here is two whole ALU ops shorter.) The other is andq $(syscall table size), %rax (again inside the ifdef block) and to round the syscall table to one less than a power of two. In my mental model of how a CPU works, the cmov approach makes more sense, since we're about to jump somewhere that depends on the syscall nr, and any *the whole point* of the mitigation here is to avoid jumping anywhere until the CPU has fully caught up with reality wrt the syscall number.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.